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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
OVERVIEW
Recently, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued a large number of
decisions concerning appeals from various administrative agencies and inter-
pretations of agency rules. Some of the decisions are important, not only for
the legal principles enunciated, but also because they deal with topics of
current public discussion. For example, the Tenth Circuit reversed the con-
troversial convictions of eighty-six protesters of the Rocky Flats nuclear
plant. This decision, however, was awaiting rehearing as of the date this
article was published.
The Tenth Circuit's discussions of administrative law include disserta-
tions on rulemaking procedures, the right to a pre-termination hearing, the
proper standard for judicial scrutiny of administrative decisions, and the ex-
haustion of remedies doctrine. Provisions of several major acts were inter-
preted. Constitutional guidelines for agency action were delineated,
including standards for obtaining administrative search warrants, for post-
hearing modifications of penalties against corporations violating safety stan-
dards, and for inspection of corporate minutes. Finally, the Tenth Circuit
examined the ever-present question of the standing requirements that parties
challenging agency action must fulfill.
I. RULEMAKING PROVISIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT
Two cases considered by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals involved
the interpretation and application of section 553 of the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act (APA).I Section 553 contains the notice and publication require-
ments which must be followed for a substantive administrative rule to be
valid. 2 The rulemaking provisions of section 553 were designed to ensure
that administrative rules be enacted fairly and that mature consideration be
given to rules of general application. 3 As one court noted, the main purpose
of the section is to permit concerned parties to comment on the rule before
any official action is taken.
4
In Beime v. Secretag of Agriculture,5 the Tenth Circuit ruled that a mere
change in wording does not require an agency to comply, for a second time,
with the rulemaking procedures mandated by section 553. The court noted
that administrative agencies are permitted to make changes in a proposed
I. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976).
2. Section 553 prescribes three requirements for rule making: publication of notice in the
Federal Register; an opportunity for persons to participate in the rulemaking procedure; and,
after the rule is established, publication in the Federal Register not less than thirty days before
its effective date. Id. § 553(b)-(d).
3. NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969).
4. Saint Francis Memorial Hosp. v. Weinberger, 413 F. Supp. 323 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
5. 645 F.2d 862 (10th Cir. 1981).
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rule after the comment period without entering into a new round of hear-
ings,6 when the changes are in character with the original rule and are "fore-
shadowed in proposals and comments advanced during the rulemaking."
7
Because the changes in Beirne were insubstantial and were for purposes of
clarity only, the court held that the rulc was lawfully promulgated.8
In another, well-publicized case, United States v. Seward,9 the court re-
versed the convictions of eighty-six individuals found guilty of trespassing at
the Rocky Flats nuclear generating plant (Rocky Flats). After passing signs
marked "no trespassing" and being warned to leave, the defendants were
arrested and subsequently found guilty of trespass. ' 0 On appeal, the defend-
ants argued that their convictions were invalid because the designation of
boundaries in the Federal Register failed to comply with section 553 of the
APA. I I
In 1965, the Atomic Energy Commission had designated the Rocky
Flats site as subject to trespass restrictions. 2 This designation, however, in-
cluded only the area enclosed by the original chain link fence and security
system. Further, no public hearing was held concerning this designation.
13
In 1975, additional property was added to the Rocky Flats plant and,
6. 645 F.2d at 865 (citing American Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 568 F.2d 284 (3d Cir.
1977)).
7. 645 F.2d at 865 (quoting South Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646, 658 (Ist Cir.
1974)).
8. 645 F.2d at 865. The challenged regulation, 7 C.F.R. § 271.3(c)(1)(iii) (1974), deals
with the question of which educational expenses can be deducted from the gross income of a
food stamp applicant to determine the applicant's net income. The regulation reads in part:
Deductions for the following household expenses shall be made (this list is inclusive
and no other deductions from income shall be allowed):
() Tuition and mandatory fees assessed by educational institutions (no deductions
shall be made for any other education expenses such as, but not limited to, the
expense of books, school supplies, meals at school, and transportation).
7 C.F.R. § 271.3(c)(1)(iii) (1974). (current version at 7 C.F.R. § 273.9(c)(3) (1981)).
This regulation was preceded by a proposed regulation which the court considered in addi-
tion to the later versions, and which read:
Deductions for the following household expenses shall be made:
(e) Educational expenses which are for tuition and mandatory school fees. This in-
cludes those tuition and mandatory school fees which are covered by scholar-
ships, educational grants, loans, fellowships, and veterans' educational benefits.
39 Fed. Reg. 3644 (1974).
The challenged regulation was also preceded by a properly promulgated 1971 regulation
which read:
Deductions for the following household expenses shall be made:
(0 Educational expenses which are for tuition and mandatory school fees, including
such expenses which are covered by scholarships, educational grants, loans, fel-
lowships, and veterans' educational benefits.
7 C.F.R. § 271.3(c)(iii)( 0 (1972) (current version at 7 C.F.R. § 273.9(c)(3) (1981)).
9. No. 79-1711 (10th Cir. Jan. 5, 1981), reheart'ng granted en ban', (10th Cir. May 5, 1981).
10. Id., slip op. at 3-4.
11. The defendants actually contended that the designation was in violation of 5 U.S.C.
§ 551-76 (1976), 42 U.S.C. § 7191-95 (1976), 10 C.F.R. § 860 (1981), and internal Department
of Energy standards published in 44 Fed. Reg. 1032 (1979). The decision, however, turned on
section 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976).
12. 30 Fed. Reg. 13,289 (1965), as annded by 32 Fed. Reg. 5382 (1967) and 40 Fed. Reg.
38,187 (1975).
13. No. 79-1711, slip op. at 8.
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sixteen days before the defendants were arrested, the Department of Energy
(DOE) designated the additional property as being part of the 1965 trespass
area. 14 Again, no public hearing was held concerning the extension of the
trespass boundaries. Thus, the defendants argued that the designation was
invalid because the agency did not comply with the thirty-day notice and
other rulemaking requirements contained in the APA. In response to this
argument, the Government maintained that the extension of the boundaries
did not change substantive rights and was therefore not subject to the notice
and comment provisions of the APA. In addition, the Government con-
tended that the defendants had actual notice of the extension and that the
defendants therefore could not plead non-compliance with the APA as a
defense. 15
The court, to find that section 553 did not apply to the boundary exten-
sion, would have had to rule that the regulation was interpretative rather
than legislative.16 As one authority has noted, "[t]he law about the distinc-
tion between interpretative and legislative rules is quite troublesome,...",7
However, a few generalizations can be made. A substantive or legislative
rule has statutory force upon enactment while interpretative rules only guide
an administrative agency in the performance of its duties.' 8 An interpreta-
tive rule, like a general policy statement, does not create any rights or obli-
gations,' 9 and it has no independent binding effect.2 0 Further, an interpre-
tative rule is a declaration issued without lawmaking authority 2 l or without
any intent to exercise that authority, and it is not determinative of the rights
or issues it addresses.
22
The DOE was granted the authority "to issue regulations relating to
entry upon .. .any facility, installation, or real property"123 subject to that
agency's jurisdiction. There was no law against trespass on the property ac-
quired in 1975 until the DOE promulgated a rule to that effect. This was
not an agency interpretation of law or a general policy statement, but rather
the creation of a new law. Thus, the boundary designation constituted sub-
stantive rulemaking. As such, it was subject to the requirements of the APA,
and a failure to comply with the requirements rendered the rule invalid.
2 4
The court also dismissed the Government's second argument, that the
defendants' actual knowledge of the entry restrictions barred the defendants
14. 44 Fed. Reg. 22,145 (1979).
15. No. 79-1711, slip op. at 9.
16. 5 U.S.C. § 553(d)(2)(a) (1976) excepts interpretive rules and general statements of pol-
icy from the publication requirement.
17. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TEXT § 5.03 at 126 (3d ed. 1972).
18. Comptroller of Treasury v. M.E. Rockhill, Inc., 205 Md. 226, 234, 107 A.2d 93, 98
(1954).
19. Str Texaco v. FPC, 412 F.2d 740, 744 (3d Cir. 1969).
20. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org. v. Simon, 506 F.2d 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
21. See Joseph v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 554 F.2d 1140, 1153-54 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
22. Set Pacific Gas v. FPC, 506 F.2d 33, 38 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 2278(a) (1976). See also, S. REP. No. 2530, 84th Cong. 2d Sess., repritedin
[1956] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4426, 4430.




from pleading the notice requirements as a defense. 25 Section 553(b) re-
quires notice before rulemaking, not after, 26 because the main purpose of the
section is to permit concerned parties to comment on the rule before any
official action is taken. The court noted that "notice of a final rule, by publi-
cation or actual notice, does not cure improper notice and commcnt procc-
dures." 2 7 Thus, the rule was invalid even though the defendants had actual
notice that the area was restricted.
Chief Judge Seth dissented and would have affirmed the convictions of
the Rocky Flats protestors. The Chief Judge felt that the actual regulation
restricting access to the plant had been properly promulgated in 1963-it
was only the effective date of the regulation that was postponed.2 8 The
Chief Judge argued that the regulation as to all facilities, then existing and
future, was adopted in 1963. Thus, "the regulation was the rulemaking un-
der Skidmore v. Swi? and Co. ",29 As such, this was the initial rule which al-
lowed the DOE to make rules of general application that did not have to be
promulgated pursuant to section 553 of the APA.
30
A review of section 553 of the APA and decisions promulgated thereun-
der indicates that the majority's analysis is the better of the two. The regula-
tion enacted on April 13, 1979, must be considered substantive lawmaking
because it imposed rights and obligations where none had existed before. As
a substantive rule, the enactment was subject to the notice and comment
procedures of the APA.
3 1
II. RIGHT TO A HEARING BEFORE TERMINATION
OF MEDICAID FUNDING
In two similar cases the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals denied a pre-
termination hearing concerning the non-renewal of Medicaid provider
agreements to nursing homes which participated in the Medicaid program
and to the patients in the homes. In Geritrics, Inc. v. Harr', 32 the court held
that because the purpose of limiting the term of a provider agreement to one
year was to assure that only facilities which comply with Medicaid regula-
tions were involved in the program, a nursing home had at most a "unilat-
eral hope" that the one year agreement would be renewed. 33 Citing Board of
Regents v. Roth,34 the court held that the home had no right to a hearing
because a "unilateral hope cannot constitute a protected 'property' interest
[which would] require a pre-termination hearing."
'3 5
25. No. 79-1711, slip op. at 17.
26. Wagner Elec. Corp. v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 1013, 1019 (3d Cir. 1972).
27. No. 79-1711, slip op. at 18.
28. No. 79-1711, Seth: C.J., dissenting op. at 6.
29. Id. at 7; Skidmore v. Swift & Co, 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
30. No. 79-1711, Seth, C.J., dissenting op. at 7 (citing Batterson v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416
(1977); General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976)).
31. At the time of this article's publication a rehearing of the Seward case was pending in
the Tenth Circuit Court. No. 79-1711 (10th Cir. May 5, 1981).
32. 640 F.2d 262 (10th Cir. 1981).
33. Id. at 265.
34. 408 U.S. 564 (1971).
35. 640 F.2d at 265. Se- also Paramount Convalescent Center Inc. v. Department of
[Vol. 59:2
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The court also noted that although the home would encounter operat-
ing difficulties because of the termination, it still was not entitled to a pre-
termination hearing. Eventide of Lakewood Nursing Home, the plaintiff,
was not the intended beneficiary of the Medicaid program. Thus, the diffi-
culties which would be encountered by the home were "not of constitutional
significance."
'3 6
In disposing of the patients' claims, the court relied on O'Bannon v. Town
Court Nursing Center,3 7 which specifically held that the residents of a nursing
home were not entitled to a hearing before the government could suspend
the home from participation in the program.38 Although a pre-termination
hearing would be required if the benefits received by the patients were with-
drawn, the decertification of a nursing home does not deprive the residents
of their direct benefits. Thus, no constitutional rights are involved.
39
In Lomond View Nursing Homes, Inc. v. Cakfano ,40 the issue addressed was
slightly different from that in Geriatrics but the conclusion was the same.
Geriatrics involved the question of whether an operating home could have its
Medicaid provider agreement terminated before a hearing on the matter. In
Lomond View, however, the termination came after an extension period which
was granted so that the nursing home corporation could build new facilities
in compliance with the Life and Safety Code.4 ' After the extension time
had run, however, the homes were still not in compliance with the Code.
Based on the reasoning in Geriatrics, the court held that there was no right to
a pre-termination hearing regardless of whether an extension had been
given.
4 2
III. SCOPE OF REVIEW
Between 1980 and 1981, the Tenth Circuit addressed the question of
judicial review of administrative decisions. The proper scope of review was
considered under section 706 of the APA;43 with regard to an Agency's inter-
pretation of its own rules; under the Mine Safety and Health Act; 44 and
where a postmaster was terminated for insubordination.
A. Informal Administrative Decisions
In CF&I Steel Corp. v. Economic Development Administration 4 5 the court
considered the standard of judicial review of an informal administrative de-
cision under section 706 of the APA. Citing Citizens to Preserve Overton Park,
Health Care Servs., 15 Cal. 3d 489, 542 P.2d 1, 125 Cal. Rptr. 265 (1975), cert. &nued, 425 U.S.
992 (1976).
36. 640 F.2d at 265.
37. 447 U.S. 773 (1980).
38. I. at 785.
39. 640 F.2d at 264.
40. 639 F.2d 674 (10th Cir. 1981).
41. 42 C.F.R. §§ 442.321-.323 (1980).
42. 639 F.2d at 676.
43. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976).
44. 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-960 (1976).
45. 624 F.2d 136 (10th Cir. 1980).
1982]
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Inc. v. Volpe,4 6 the court noted that when dealing with informal agency ac-
tion, the function of judicial review is threefold. First, the court must deter-
mine the authority of the agency. Second, the court must be certain that the
agency complied with prescribed procedures. Finally, the reviewing court
must determine whether the challenged action was arbitrary, capricious, or
an abuse of discretion.
4 7
While this review might seem broad, "the ultimate standard of review is
a narrow one,"48 and neither the substantial evidence test nor de novo re-
view apply. Under Seatrain International v. Federal Maritime Commission,49 the
court, before substituting its judgment for the agency's, must decide if the
action has a rational basis on the facts. 50 If the facts supporting the agency's
action are adequately adduced and rationally applied, then the court may
not substitute its judgment for that of the agency.
5 '
CF&I Steel Corporation challenged the dismissal of a declaratory judg-
ment action which claimed violations of the Public Works and Economic
Development Act of 1965,52 of regulations implementing the Act, 53 and of
the Steel Industry Lending Guidelines.54 CF&I claimed that the Economic
Development Administration (EDA) unlawfully guaranteed a $63.5 million
loan to the Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corporation. Extensive studies were
entered into by the EDA before approval of the loan guarantee, and the
agency felt that the guarantee was proper.
5 5
CF&I, however, attacked the decision of EDA, arguing that the studies
made were incorrect and not thorough enough. CF&I's objections went to
the weight of the evidence, however, and the court could not change the
judgment because the EDA study and decision were "adequately adduced
and rationally applied."' 56 Further, CF&I could not show any fraud, bad
faith, or bias on the part of the EDA.5 7 Thus, given the limited scope of
review with regard to informal agency action and CF&I's failure to show
bad faith, the court was correct in affirming the EDA decision.
B. Review of An Ageny's Interpretation of Its Own Regulations
In Morrson & Morrison, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor,58 the court considered the
standard for reviewing an administrative agency's interpretation of its own
regulations. Morrison & Morrison, Inc., a real estate brokerage firm, sought
to employ an alien in its business and offered to pay the alien $600 per
46. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
47. 624 F.2d at 139 (quoting Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. at
415-17).
48. 624 F.2d at 139 (quoting Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. at
416).
49. 598 F.2d 289, 292-93 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3121-3246 (1976).
53. 13 C.F.R. § 301 (1981).
54. 43 Fed. Reg. 16,360 (1978).
55. 624 F.2d at 138-40.
56. Id. at 140.
57. Id. at 141.
58. 626 F.2d 771 (10th Cir. 1980).
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month plus commissions. Based on this offer, Morrison & Morrison, Inc.,
petitioned the Secretary of Labor to employ Tom Kite, a resident of Eng-
land, pursuant to section 1182(a)(14) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act.
59
For a domestic employer to comply with the Act, the employer must
show, among other things, that he has attempted to fill the position, recruit-
ing at the prevailing wage within the United States. 60 Further, an employer
must advertise the position in a professional publication calculated to reach
interested nationals. 6' The Secretary of Labor interpreted section
656.21(b)(4) as requiring the guaranteed wage for commission-compensated
employment to be the prevailing wage or, in this case, $1200. In addition,
the Secretary construed section 656.21(b)(9)(i) as requiring a more extensive
publication than was provided by Morrison & Morrison, Inc.
62
Citing United States v. Laronoff,63 the court noted that "[t]he standard for
reviewing an administrative agency's interpretation of its own regulations is
'plainly erroneous or inconsistent.' "64 Because the Secretary's construction
of the regulation was not plainly erroneous or inconsistent with prior inter-
pretations, the court had little choice but to affirm the lower court's decision.
C. Judicial Review Under the Mine Safety and Health Act
In American Coal Co. v. United States Department of Labor,65 the Tenth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals interpreted a provision of the Mine Safety and Health
Acts6 as implicitly providing for the review of actions taken by a coal mine
inspector. According to the court, this review would initially be within the
administrative agency, subject to final consideration by the court of
appeals.
6 7
A Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) inspector inspected
a coal mine owned by the Utah Power and Light Company after a portion
of the mine collapsed. The inspector concluded that the roof control plan
was inadequate, and issued an order temporarily closing a large section of
the mine. 68 American Coal responded to the order by filing suit in the
United States District Court for the District of Utah alleging that the inspec-
tor was not authorized to issue such an order. 69 The suit in the federal dis-
trict court was, however, dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
70
American Coal appealed this dismissal, contending that the Act did not
provide for administrative review. Therefore, according to American Coal,
any order made pursuant to the statute was properly reviewable in a federal
59. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(14) (1976).
60. 20 C.F.R. § 656.21(b) (1981).
61. 20 C.F.R. § 656.21(b)(9)(i) (1981).
62. 626 F.2d at 773.
63. 431 U.S. 864 (1977).
64. 626 F.2d at 773 (citing United States v. Larionoff, 431 U.S. at 872).
65. 639 F.2d 659 (10th Cir. 1981).
66. 30 U.S.C. § 813(k) (Supp. 1II 1979).
67. 639 F.2d at 661.





district court and not, as the lower court ruled, first reviewable by the
MSHA review board and then by the court of appeals.71
The Tenth Circuit noted that while section 813(k) of the Act does not
explicitly provide for administrative review, review can be implied from a
reading of the entire Act along with its legislative history. 72 Thus, initial
jurisdiction to review the action taken by the inspector was properly vested
in the MSHA review board, with final review in the court of appeals. As
support for this proposition, the court cited Whitney Bank v. New Orleans
Bank 73 in which the Supreme Court stated "where Congress has provided
statutory review procedures designed to permit agency expertise to be
brought to bear on particular problems, those procedures are to be exclusive.
• . .To permit a district court to make the initial determination of a plan's
propriety would substantially decrease the effectiveness of the statutory
design."
'74
D. The Substantial Evidence Test
Substantial evidence has been defined as "such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." '7 5 Sub-
stantial evidence is "something less than the weight of the evidence and the
possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does
not prevent an administrative agency's finding from being supported by sub-
stantial evidence." '76 This test was applied by the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals in Henkle v. Campbell.77 Henkle had been fired from his job as post-
master after a finding of insubordination by the Civil Service Commission.
Although removal for insubordination is permissible under federal law, 78 the
court was concerned whether the appellant's responses to an order from his
supervisor constituted insubordination.
In applying the substantial evidence test to the facts, the court noted
that the appellant's refusal to refrain from calling the local police chief a
"chicken shit son of a bitch" after a direct order from his superior to cease
using such language and the appellant's failure to report to a fitness for duty
examination clearly constituted a rational basis for the Commission's ac-
tion. 79 Thus, the holding was supported by substantial evidence and the
decision of the Commission to dismiss Henkle was affirmed.
IV. EXHAUSTION OF REMEDIES
In two similar cases, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals considered the
exhaustion of remedies doctrine in the context of state parole board deci-
71. Id.
72. Id. at 661-62.
73. 379 U.S. 411 (1965).
74. 639 F.2d at 662 (quoting Whitney Bank v. New Orleans Bank, 379 U.S. at 420).
75. Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938).
76. Consolo v. FMC, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966).
77. 626 F.2d 811 (10th Cir. 1980).
78. 5 C.F.R. § 752.104(a) (1977) (current version at 5 C.F.R. § 752.301 (1981)) (incorpo-
rating 5 U.S.C. § 7513 (Supp. III 1979)).
79. 626 F.2d at 813.
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sions. Under federal law,8 0 a state inmate's petition to a federal court for a
writ of habeas corpus will be dismissed unless the prisoner has exhausted all
available state remedies. 8' If there are no adequate state remedies available,
however, the statute provides that a prisoner need not attempt to exhaust
state remedies before petitioning for relief in federal court.
8 2
In Schuemann v. Colorado Slate Board ofAdull Parole,8 3 the Tenth Circuit, in
following a previous decision,8 4 noted that the standard of review for parole
board decisions is whether the action was "arbitrary, capricious or an abuse
of discretion."
8 5
Because there were no state remedies available to Schuemann, who was
confined in the Colorado State Penetentiary, the petition was properly
before the court. Schuemann contended, for various reasons, that the parole
board's decision to deny him parole was a denial of due process.8 6 The
court, however, found that the parole board's decision was neither arbitrary
nor capricious, nor was there any abuse of discretion.8 7 Thus, Schuemann's
petition was denied.
In a similar case, Shea v. Hegg'e,a8 the court of appeals reversed the lower
court's invocation of the exhaustion doctrine. The district court held that
inmates in the Colorado State Penetentiary had remedies which could have
been pursued.8 9 However, the Colorado Supreme Court, in answering a cer-
tified question from the federal court of appeals, 9° held that the decision to
deny parole is discretionary and not subject to judicial review in the state
courts. Thus, the invocation of the exhaustion doctrine was improper and
the court remanded the case for reconsideration based on its decision in
Schuemann v. Colorado State Board of Adult Parole. 9 '
80. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1976) reads as follows:
(b) An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursu-
ant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that the
applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, or that there
is either an absence of available State corrective process or the existence of circum-
stances rendering such process ineffective to protect the rights of the prisoner.
81. Slayton v. Smith, 404 U.S. 53 (1971); Shea v. Heggie, 624 F.2d 175 (10th Cir. 1980);
Watson v. Patterson, 358 F.2d 297 (10th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 876 (1966). See In re:
Question Concerning State Judicial Review of Parole Denial, 610 P.2d 1340 (Colo. 1980).
In two unpublished decisions, the Tenth Circuit dismissed petitions for writs of habeas
corpus because state remedies had not been exhausted. Raine v. Warden, No. 80-1265 (10th
Cir. Feb. 27, 198 1) (not for routine publication); Ford v. Griffin, No. 79-2084 (10th Cir. June 30,
1980) (not for routine publication).
82. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1976).
83. 624 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980).
84. Dye v. United States Parole Comm'n, 558 F.2d 1376 (10th Cir. 1977).
85. 624 F.2d at 173.
86. Id. For an excellent discussion of the due process clause and parole board decisions see
Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 8-16 (1979).
87. 624 F.2d at 175.
88. 624 F.2d 175 (10th Cir. 1980).
89. Gomez v. Colorado State Parole Bd, 470 F. Supp. 778 (D. Colo. 1979), rev'd, 624 F.2d
175 (10th Cir. 1980).
90. In re: Question Concerning State Judicial Review of Parole Denial, 610 P.2d 1340
(Colo. 1980).
91. 624 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980).
19821
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V. RATE CHANGES UNDER THE FEDERAL AVIATION ACT OF 1958
In Frontier Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 9 2 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
interpreted the Federal Aviation Act of 195893 as allowing for individual
adjustment of subsidy awards under certain conditions. Frontier Airlines
sought review of its subsidy allotment from December 2, 1969 to June 30,
1971, awarded under the Act 94 which empowers the Civil Aeronautics Board
(CAB) to "fix . . . fair and reasonable rates of compensation for the trans-
portation of mail by aircraft," 95 taking into consideration the needs of each
carrier. Frontier sought an increase in its subsidy because it was operating at
a significant loss in an attempt to maintain service on small, unprofitable
runs under the class rate system set up by the CAB.
96
The CAB, however, denied an individual subsidy increase to Frontier
Airlines and emphasized its policy of favoring the class rate system in setting
subsidy awards. 97 The CAB noted that the class rate system was favorable
because it was simple and it increased incentives toward carrier efficiency. 98
It also noted that carriers who remain in the class system are more motivated
to "pare costs in order to maximize profits in good times, and to minimize
losses in bad times." 99 Further, the CAB held that for a carrier to show need
and therefore be entitled to an individualized rate, "its ultimate survival
[must be] in jeopardy."' ° Thus, because Frontier Airlines was not in dan-
ger of bankruptcy, the individualized rate was denied.
On appeal, the decision turned on the court's interpretation of "need"
under section 1356 of the Act. The court noted that under the statute, a
"carrier must be permitted to leave the Class System and seek an individual-
ized rate, when it can show that the. . . class rate does not adequately take
into consideration its "need," and that it is operating under 'honest, econom-
ical, and efficient management.' "101 Need, however, does not mean an air
carrier must be faced with bankruptcy. Rather, the carrier must show that it
is being denied a fair profit under the class rate system.' 0 2 Thus, the CAB
was incorrect in its interpretation of the statute.
The court also held that the CAB erroneously considered profits made
by Frontier outside of the challenged time period.'0 3 The court noted that
in determining need, the CAB should have reviewed only profits and losses
92. 629 F.2d 643 (10th Cir. 1980).
93. 49 U.S.C. § 1301 (1976).
94. Id. § 1376.
95. Id. § 1376(a).
96. This system was created as a means "of just compensation for services rendered to the
Government by requiring that fair and reasonable rates be fixed from time to time for carrying
of the mail." Capital Airlines v. CAB, 171 F.2d 339, 340 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 961
(1948). Airlines receive subsidies from the government as an incentive to maintain what would
otherwise be unprofitable routes to small communities. Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, 280 F.2d
636 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 870 (1960).
97. Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 1376(b).
98. 629 F.2d at 646.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 648.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 649.
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incurred during the period in question and should not have reached into the
closed rate period as set forth in the Act,1° 4 because profits earned during
closed rate periods are not to be diminished by refusing to adjust losses dur-
ing an open rate period.' 0 5
VI. THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT
A. Due Process
In Garcia v. Caifano,10 6 the Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision of the
New Mexico District Court and the Secretary of Health, Education and
Welfare (HEW), which denied Garcia's claim for social security disability
benefits. Garcia's application for disability listed sciatica arthritis as his ail-
ment and, in addition, he submitted two medical histories and disability re-
ports which buttressed his allegation of disability due to arthritis.107
The HEW Secretary denied his claim and, subsequently, Garcia ob-
tained a hearing before the Social Security Administration examiner. Gar-
cia received a notice of hearing which advised him of his right to
representation; 10 8 how. ver, he appeared at the hearing pro se. The hearing
examiner did not re-advise him of the right to counsel; rather, the examiner
questioned him about his back, his previous drinking problem, and his work
history.
On appeal, Garcia contended that he was denied due process because
first, he was not advised at the hearing of his right to be represented by
counsel. Secondly, the hearing examiner did not inquire about his condition
of depression as a cause of his alleged disability. The Tenth Circuit rejected
both arguments, holding that the applicable statute' 0 9 and regulation" ,0 did
not require the hearing examiner to advise the plaintiff of his right to repre-
sentation by an attorney. The court distinguished Brooks v. Califano,iii
which had held that a hearing examiner should make certain a claimant for
disability benefits is cognizant of the possible availability of free legal serv-
104. 49 U.S.C. § 1376(b) (1976).
105. 629 F.2d at 649 (citing Transatlantic Final Mail Rate Case, Reopened, 23 C.A.B. 307,
323 (1956)).
106. 625 F.2d 354 (10th Cir. 1980).
107. Id. at 355.
108. Id.
109. 42 U.S.C. § 405(b) (1976), provides that:
The Secretary is directed to make findings of fact, and decisions as to the rights of any
individual applying for a payment under this subchapter. Upon request by any such
individual . . . who makes a showing in writing that his or her rights may be
prejudiced by any decision the Secretary has rendered, he shall give such applicant
... reasonable notice and opportunity for a hearing with respect to such
decision....
Cf Muenich v. United States, 410 F. Supp. 944 (N.D. Ind. 1976); Lonzollo v. Weinberger, 387
F. Supp. 892 (N.D. Il1. 1974), rev on oher growzd, 534 F.2d 712 (7th Cir. 1976).
110. 20 C.F.R. § 404.923 (1980) (current version at 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.936-.938):
The presiding officer shall fix a time. . . for the hearing, written notice of which,.
shall be mailed to the parties ... not less than 10 days prior to such time .... The
notice of hearing shall include the time and place of the hearing, and a statement of
the specific issues to be determined, and matters on which findings will be made and
decision reached. The parties shall be informed of their right to representation. ...
i11. 440 F. Supp. 1341 (Del. 1977), afdmein., 586 F.2d 834 (3d Cir. 1978).
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ices. The court found, however, that the Brooks holding was applicable only
if "the claimant's record at the hearing was not fully developed or. . .there
were serious gaps therein which could have been filled if counsel had been
present .... 112
Garcia's second contention was held to be without merit because the
subject of depression was never raised prior to the hearing or during the
hearing. As a result, the examiner, in denying the claim, made no findings
with respect to depression. The court held that Garcia was responsible for
raising the issue of his depression if he intended to base his disability claim
on depression.'" 3 The court denied his request that the cause be remanded
to the Secretary for further proceedings." 
4
B. Judicial Review under the Social Security Act
Two cases necessitated the Tenth Circuit's consideration of standards
for judicial review. In Clements v. Caifano," 5 the court, utilizing the substan-
tial evidence standard, affirmed the district court's decision denying dis-
ability benefits. In Kroenke v. Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare," ' 6 the
court upheld the district court's finding that additional evidence submitted
by the plaintiff, in an effort to overturn an earlier denial of benefits, merely
duplicated the previous evidence and contained no new information.'17
In the Clements case, the plaintiff-appellant applied for disability bene-
fits alleging that he had contracted emphysema and rheumatoid arthritis. " 18
He was granted a hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ). During
the hearing the plaintiff, his ex-wife, and his daughter testified with respect
to his alleged disability."' 9 Additional evidence included medical reports
from five doctors who had examined the plaintiff. Two of the doctors con-
cluded that the plaintiff could not engage in gainful work, while two doctors
determined that he could return to work.' 2 0 The ALJ found that the claim-
ant's alleged maladies were of limited severity; consequently, the claimant
was able to engage in gainful employment.'
2'
Pursuant to the applicable law, 122 the claimant filed suit in the district
112. 625 F.2d at 356.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 356-57.
115. No. 79-1566 (10th Cir. April 16, 1981) (not for routine publication).
116. No. 79-1565 (10th Cir. Jan. 8, 1981) (not for routine publication).
117. No. 79-1565, slip op. at 7.
118. No. 79-1566, slip op. at 2.
119. Id., slip op. at 2-3. The plaintiff attested to the fact that he had a tenth grade educa-
tion and had been trained as a beautician. He worked in that capacity until the onset of his
alleged disability. Id., slip op. at 3.
120. Id., slip op. at 4. One doctor was noncommittal and made no determination with
respect to the plaintiff's ability to work. Id.
121. Id., slip op. at 5.
122. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1976) (amended 1980) provides that:
Any individual, after any final decision of the Secretary made after a hearing to which
he was a party, irrespective of the amount in controversy, may obain a review of such
decision by a civil action commenced within sixty days after the mailing to him of
notice of such decision or within such further time as the Secretary may allow. Such
action shall be brought in the district court of the United States for the judicial district
in which the plaintiff resides . ...
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court alleging, among other matters, that the facts did not support the denial
of benefits. The district court affirmed the ALJ's decision, holding that if the
Secretary's decision was supported by substantial evidence, then that deci-
sion must be affirmed.
1 23
The Tenth Circuit agreed and affirmed the lower court's decision deny-
ing the claimant's application for disability benefits. The appellate court
rejected the claimant's contention that he was psychiatrically disabled and
that, therefore, the ALJ's finding was in error. Relying on Kelbach v. Har-
rs,t2 4 the court held that the burden of proof was on the claimant to estab-
lish disability.1 25 In addition, when the court is reviewing the record, the
court is restricted by the Secretary's determination. 26 However, the court
can determine whether the Secretary's decision was arbitrary, capricious, or
an abuse of discretion.' 2 7 Moreover, the court upheld the district court's
determination that the Secretary's decision was supported by substantial evi-
dence. The court relied on Richardson . Perales,128 and held that regardless of
123. No. 79-1566, slip op. at 6. See Brown v. Harris, No. 80-1201 (10th Cir. Feb. 27, 1981)
(not for routine publication); Gardner v. Bishop, 362 F.2d 917 (10th Cir. 1966).
124. 634 F.2d 1304 (10th Cir. 1980).
125. No. 79-1566, slip op. at 8. Disability is defined as "inability to engage in any substan-
tial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment
which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a
continuous period of not less than twelve months." 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i)(1), 423(d)(l)(A) (1976).
See Osteen v. Califano, No. 80-2233 (10th Cir. April 30, 1981) (not for routine publication).
In Biffle v. Harris, No. 79-2074 (10th Cir. Jan. 19, 1981) (not for routine publication), the
Tenth Circuit elucidated a tripartite test to determine whether a claimant qualified for disabil-
ity benefits. Tommie J. Biffle, a forty-six year old woman with a ninth grade education, applied
for disability insurance alleging that she suffered from "neuritis, reflex dystrophy in her shoul-
ders, ulcers, and other stomach problems." Id., slip op. at 4. Prior to submission of this applica-
tion, Biffle had worked as a waitress, cotton picker, and beautician.
Setting forth the applicable standard by which the Bffje case would be adjudicated, the
court held:
First, the burden is upon the claimant to establish that she is suffering from physical or
mental impairment of such severity that she is unable to perform her former work,
considering her age, education, and work experience. If this is established, the burden
shifts to the Secretary to establish by competent evidence that the claimant, consider-
ing her impairment, age, education, and work experience, is nevertheless able to en-
gage in other types of substantial gainful employment that exist in significant numbers
in the national economy. Under the third prong, the burden shifts back to the claim-
ant to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that she could not engage in
those types of employment the Secretary has shown to be available for persons suffer-
ing from impairments similar to claimant's.
Id., slip op. at 4-5. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
Applying this test to the facts, the court affirmed the Secretary's ruling that, taking into
account the claimant's background, Biffle could work as a "sales person, cashier, sewing
machine operator, and alteration seamstress or similar occupation." No. 79-2074, slip op. at 6.
Biffie failed to demonstrate her inability to engage in employment. See Van Natter v. Secretary
of HEW, No. 79-1439 (10th Cir. Jan. 8, 1981); Valentine v. Richardson, 468 F.2d 588 (10th Cir.
1972); Keating v. Secretary of HEW, 468 F.2d 788 (10th Cir. 1972).
126. No. 79-1566, slip op. at 9. See also Mandrell v. Weinberger, 511 F.2d 1102 (10th Cir.
1975); Johnson v. Finch, 437 F.2d 1321 (10th Cir. 1971).
127. No. 79-1566; slip op. at 9-10; Edwards v. Califano, 619 F.2d 865, 868 (10th Cir. 1980)
(quoting Sabin v. Butz, 515 F.2d 1061, 1066-67 (10th Cir. 1975)).
128. 402 U.S. 389 (1971). The Supreme Court held that reports of physicians who had
examined the plaintiff constituted substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is "more than a
mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate




the fact that two doctors determined the claimant was disabled and two
doctors arrived at the opposite conclusion, nevertheless, substantial evidence
existed. As a result, the Secretary's determination could not be considered
arbitrary and capricious.
129
in Cagle v. Cafifano,' 30 the plaintiff Cagle sought relief from thc decision
of the HEW Secretary denying his application for disability benefits. Cagle
had applied for disability benefits alleging that he suffered from back pains
which affected his ability to work as a welder. The ALJ denied Cagle's ap-
plication and the district court affirmed, holding that the ALJ's decision was
supported by substantial evidence. 13' On appeal, the plaintiff requested
that the case be remanded to the Secretary for the consideration of new and
material medical evidence 132 pursuant to section 4 05(g) of the Social Secur-
ity Act. 133 The plaintiff alleged that the new evidence, which consisted of
reports stating that the plaintiff was unemployable, was not available prior
to the initial administrative determination.'
34
The court had to consider whether this information fell under the ru-
bric of cumulative or new information. The court was persuaded by a
Fourth Circuit decision' 35 which defined new evidence as evidence that
might reasonably have changed the Secretary's decision "had that (new) evi-
dence been before him when his decision was rendered."'1 36 The Tenth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals affirmed the ALJ's decision that the applicant was not
disabled. The court, however, remanded the case to the district court for
consideration of the new medical evidence.
13 7
C. Interpretation of Social Security Act Provisions
In Hammond v. Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare,' 38 a mother of
two disabled' 39 children challenged the Secretary's decision to terminate the
benefits of her minor sons, William H. Ross and Richard R. Ross. The Sec-
retary's determination was based on the ground that the children's stepfa-
ther's income was attributable to them. Consequently, the children were no
longer eligible to receive Supplemental Security Income (SSI). The Secre-
tary reached this determination after reviewing the applicable statute 40 and
129. No. 79-1566, slip op. at 11.
130. 638 F.2d 219 (10th Cir. 1981).
131. 638 F.2d at 220. See text accompanying note 127, supra.
132. 638 F.2d at 221.
133. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1976) as amendedby Social Security Disability Amendments of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-265, § 307, 94 Stat. 458.
134. 638 F.2d at 221.
135. King v. Califano, 599 F.2d 597 (4th Cir. 1979).
136. 638 F.2d at 221 (quoting King v. Califano, 599 F.2d at 599); see Kroenke v. Secretary
of HEW, No. 79-1565 (10th Cir. Jan. 8, 1981).
137. 638 F.2d at 221.
138. 646 F.2d 455 (10th Cir. 1981).
139. For a definition of disability, see note 125 supra and accompanying text.
140. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(0(2) (1976) states in pertinent part:
For purposes of determining eligibility for and the amount of benefits for any individ-
ual who is a child under age 21, such individual's income and resources shall be
deemed to include any income and resources of a parent of such individual (or the
spouse of such a parent) who is living in the same household as such individual,
[Vol. 59:2
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
the agency regulation enforcing the statute.' 4'
Counsel for the plaintiff focused his argument on the last sentence of the
applicable statute 42 and interpreted this sentence as requiring the Secretary
to make an ad hoc determination of whether the income of a parent, or step-
parent, is actually available to the disabled child.' 43 The district court
agreed with this interpretation and remanded the case to the Secretary, or-
dering the Secretary to decide whether the stepfather's income was actually
available in this case.
The Tenth Circuit emphatically rejected this stance holding that:
To interpret the statutory language "except to the extent deter-
mined by the Secretary to be inequitable under the circumstances"
as meaning that income of a stepparent is chargeable to the dis-
abled child only if such income is actually available to the stepchild
would render meaningless the prior statutory language that such
income is deemed income of the child "whether or not available to
such individual." The "except" language in the statute . . . can-
not be read to excise from the statute the prior clause providing
that income of the parent, or stepparent, is chargeable to the child
"whether or not available." To interpret the statute in the manner
suggested by counsel would require this Court to give a meaning to
statutory language that is at least somewhat nebulous in nature
which would totally negate other statutory language which is crys-
tal clear in its meaning. This we decline to do.' 44
In addition, the court relied heavily on Kolleti o. Hams, 4 5 a First Cir-
cuit decision, which also rejected the argument that the Secretary must de-
termine the actual availability of a parent's income to a disabled child.' 46 In
Kolett, disabled children who were eligible for SSI benefits brought an ac-
tion against the HEW Secretary, challenging the constitutionality of section
1382c(f)(2) of the Social Security Act. 147 The First Circuit held that the
statute was constitutional; however, the court affirmed in pa(t, reversed in
part, and remanded the case to the district court because the 1974 regula-
tions were procedurally defective.'
48
Although the Tenth Circuit relied on Kollet, the court noted that the
whether or not available to such individual, except to the extent determined by the
Secretary to be inequitable under the circumstances.
141. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1185(b) (1980) provides that:
In the case of an individual who is a child (as defined in § 416.1050) and under age 21,
such child's income shall, subject to the succeeding sentences of this paragraph and to
paragraph (c) of this section, be deemed to include (except as otherwise provided in
this section), any income (as defined in § 416.1102(a)) of a parent of such individual
(or the spouse of such a parent) who is not eligible for benefits under this part and is
living in the same household as the child whether or not such income is available to
the child.
142. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c()(2) (1976).
143. 646 F.2d at 457.
144. Id.
145. 619 F.2d 134 (1st Cir. 1980).
146. Id. at 139 n.4.
147. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(0(2) (1976) (amended 1980).
148. 619 F.2d at 145-46.
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constitutional issue slightly differentiated Kolleti and other cases'
49
from the Hammond case. The court reversed and remanded the case ordering
the trial court to affirm the Secretary's decision.
150
The Tenth Circuit's decision in Kimmes v. Harris 15' concerned the sensi-
tive subject of senior citizens subsisting on a fixed income. The appellee in
Kimmes was a sixty-year-old widow suffering from a heart condition who
received monthly welfare payments of $187.80.152 In addition, Kimmes re-
sided, rent free, in a small one bedroom trailer owned by her daughter.
Kimmes paid the cost of maintaining the trailer. The ALJ determined that
since the rental value of the trailer was $150 per month, Kimmes received in-
kind income of eighty dollars per month.1
53
Faced with these facts, the district court was required to determine
whether this rental arrangement between Kimmes and her daughter consti-
tuted in-kind income. The district court reversed the Secretary's determina-
tion, holding that Kimmes had not received in-kind income. After reviewing
the apposite statute 54 and regulation,' 55 the lower court reasoned that since
no income was "actually available"' 56 to Kimmes, the extent to which the
rental value of the mobile home exceeded the maintenance payments could
not be counted against Kimmes' disability benefits.1'
5 7
Chief Judge Seth, speaking for the appellate court, reversed the district
court and held that Kimmes' living arrangement did provide her with in-
kind income. The Tenth Circuit, relying heavily on cases from other dis-
tricts that encompassed similar circumstances, 158 concluded that the ration-
149. Termini v. Califano, 464 F. Supp. 797 (W.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 611 F.2d 367 (2d Cir. 1979).
See also Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960).
150. 646 F.2d at 459.
151. 647 F.2d 1028 (10th Cir. 1981).
152. Id. at 1030.
153. Id. The ALJ arrived at this figure by subtracting the maintenance costs of $70 from
the rental value of $150. Id.
154. 42 U.S.C. § 1382a(a) (1976) provides in relevant part:
Income; definition of earned and unearned income; exclusions from income; and...
(1) earned income means only
(A) wages...
(B) net earning from self employment . . .and
(2) unearned income means all other income, including . . .
(A) support and maintenance furnished in cash or in kind; except that
(i) in the case of any individual . . .living in another person's house-
hold and receiving support and maintenance in kind from such person,
the dollar amounts otherwise applicable to such individual . . .shall
be reduced by 331/3 percent in lieu of including such support and main-
tenance in the unearned income of such individual ...
155. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1102 (1980) provides:
(a) Meaning ofincome. The term "income" ... means the receipt by an individual of
any property or services which he can apply, either directly or by sale or conver-
sion, to meeting his basic needs for food, clothing and shelter.
(c) Unearned income. The term "unearned income" means all income that is not included
in the definition.
See 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.1102, .1110, .1120 (1981).
156. Kimmes v. Califano, 472 F. Supp. 474, 476 (D. Colo. 1979), rev'd, 647 F.2d 1028 (10th
Cir. 1981). In addition, the lower court relied on decisions dealing with welfare programs, id. at
476, which the appellate court found inapposite. Kimmes v. Harris, 647 F.2d at 1033 n.4.
157. 472 F. Supp. at 476.
158. 647 F.2d at 1033. See Antonioli v. Harris, 624 F.2d 78 (9th Cir. 1980). Antomoh" in-
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ale utilized in the other cases was relevant to the Kimmes case. The Tenth
Circuit held that Kimmes' living arrangement constituted in-kind income
which was actually available to her. "The fact that such benefit is not in




A. Independent Contractors and Parent Corporations
In a significant line of cases, the Tenth Circuit examined the exclusive
remedy provisions of state and federal Workers' Compensation Acts as ap-
plied to employees who attempt to sue a principal employer or parent corpo-
ration for injuries sustained in the course of employment. The court also
addressed various ancillary issues dealing with the accrual of a cause of ac-
tion against the United States as well as with the scope of the Federal Tort
Claims Act. 160
The issue in Arrington v. W'sconszn-Mzchzgan Pipeline Co. 161 was whether
the employees of an independent contractor could recover amounts in excess
of those received under workers' compensation, when suing the independent
contractor's employer as the third party tortfeasor under the Oklahoma
Workers' Compensation Act (Compensation Act).' 62 The plaintiffs, employ-
ees of an independent contractor, brought common law tort actions against
Wisconsin-Michigan Pipeline Company, the principal employer, after sev-
eral workers were killed or injured in an explosion while performing con-
struction work on Wisconsin-Michigan's pipeline. The explosion occurred
when, after the independent contractor's workers built a fire to keep warm,
an employee of Wisconsin-Michigan negligently turned on a valve releasing
natural gas. The natural gas combusted when it reached the flames.163
The plaintiffs sought actual and punitive damages against Wisconsin-
volved an SSI recipient who lived in a house owned by his father. Although the recipient paid
no rent, he did pay the property taxes and maintenance expenses. The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that this living arrangement constituted in-kind support from the recipient's fa-
ther. Styles v. Harris, 503 F. Supp. 125 (D. Md. 1980), concerned a supplemental security
income recipient who rented an apartment from her son for $80 per month. The market value
of the apartment was $100 per month. As a result, the district court held that the recipient had
in-kind income of $20. In Wynn v. Harris, 494 F. Supp. 878 (W.D. Tenn. 1980), the recipients
resided rent-free in a home owned by their children. Once again, the district court held that the
living arrangement constituted in-kind income. In Buschmann v. Harris, No. 78-622 (D. Or.
March 11, 1980), the recipient lived in a dwelling owned by his son. The recipient paid $80 per
month for a dwelling that had a current market value of $145 dollars. The district court held
that the difference between the rent actually paid and the market value constituted in-kind
income. As Kmzmes pointed out, "an SSI recipient who obtains shelter at less than the fair rental
value does have money available which otherwise would be spent on shelter, and . . . accord-
ingly, such savings represents money 'actually available' to the recipient." Kimmes v. Califano,
647 F.2d at 1032.
159. 647 F.2d at 1033-34.
160. Ch. 753, Title IV, 60 Stat. 842 (1946) (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
161. 632 F.2d 867 (10th Cir. 1980). This decision was later cited in an unpublished deci-
sion, Nezhadian v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., No. 78-2059 (10th Cir. Dec. 3, 1980), as con-
trolling in the disposition of that case.
162. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85, § 44 (West Supp. 1979).
163. 632 F.2d at 868.
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Michigan for gross, wanton, and willful negligence in the instruction and
supervision of its employees. The action was dismissed on the ground that
the sole remedy available to plaintiffs was afforded under the Compensation
Act. 164 The workers appealed, claiming that the language of the Compensa-
tion Act preserved their right to sue third parties. 
16 5
In rejecting the appellants' arguments, the court cited a consistent line
of authority holding that a worker's exclusive remedy as the employee of an
independent contractor arises under the Compensation Act.1
66  In
Oklahoma, there is no recourse under ordinary tort theory against the prin-
cipal employer where the independent contractor's employees were injured
while performing labor that was "an integral part of the principal em-
ployer's business."'
167
The appellants also failed to persuade the court that allegations of gross
negligence would bring the claims outside the purview of the Compensation
Act, on the rationale that the Compensation Act applies only to "accidental"
personal injuries, not willful or intentional acts committed by the employer.
The court cited cases holding that willful acts may be characterized as "acci-
dents" 168 if they incorporate an element of chance, that is, if they are unu-
sual or unexpected events. 169 The explosion resulting in the lawsuits against
Michigan-Wisconsin was deemed to be accidential. Further, the court re-
fused to characterize the Michigan-Wisconsin employee's act of turning the
wrong valve on as "willful," because it was not a deliberate act.'
70
In concluding, the Tenth Circuit interpreted the Oklahoma Workers'
Compensation Act as "barring all common law actions against the principal
employer based upon the negligence of its employee.'
7 ' The court also re-
jected the plaintiffs' argument that Michigan-Wisconsin should remain in
the litigation because an inherently dangerous activity was involved, in
which case the principal contractor should be held liable for an independent
contractor's torts. Since no such situation had been alleged in the plaintiffs'
complaint, the court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the action.
172
The court expanded upon these conclusions in Love o. Flour Mills of
America.173 Some employees of Flour Mills were seriously injured in a series
of dust explosions at Flour Mills' grain elevator. The workers alleged gross,
wanton, and willful negligence on the part of the defendants-Flour Mills,
its parent corporation Chickasha Cotton Oil Company, and an insurance
company Houston General Insurance Company-in the maintenance and
inspection of the plant. The court was called upon to resolve three issues:
1) whether the Compensation Act's exclusive jurisdiction can be sidestepped
by allegations of gross, willful, and wanton negligence on the employer's
164. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85, § 44 (West Supp. 1979).
165. 632 F.2d at 869.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 870.
169. Id. (citing Stasmas v. State Indus. Comm'n, 80 Okla. 221, 222, 195 P. 762, 763 (1921)).
170. 632 F.2d at 871.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. 647 F.2d 1058 (10th Cir. 1981).
[Vol. 59:2
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
part; 2) whether an employer's insurance carrier, joined in the action as de-
fendant for alleged failure to inspect adequately and to warn, may claim as a
defense the employer's immunity from common law tort actions; and
3) whether the employee of a subsidiary may sue the parent corporation for
injuries resulting from the parent corporation's negligence.
174
The court reiterated the doctrine of the Arrrngton case, that claims of
negligence against an employer, no matter the degree of aggravation, are
barred by the Oklahoma Workers' Compensation Act.' 75 The insurance
carrier, here viewed as an alter ego of the employer for the purpose of tort
immunity, could also claim the "exclusive remedy" defense against common-
law tort liability. 176 The Tenth Circuit concluded that Oklahoma does not
recognize any cause of action against an employer's insurer for negligent
inspection. '
77
The court then discussed at length the immunity available to parent
corporations in each jurisdiction. Louisiana considers the parent corpora-
tion to be a statutory employer in workers' compensation cases, 178 and thus
immune from common-law tort liability, if the subsidiary is merely an oper-
ating division of the parent corporation. However, most jurisdictions attri-
bute a separate and independent identity to parent corporations. ' 79 Thus,
in the majority of jurisdictions, a parent corporation will not be immune
from tort liability to its subsidiary's employees. There is one exception: torts
committed by the parent in a representative or managerial capacity are the
liability of the subsidiary alone.1'0 Chickasha, the parent corporation,
would have been liable at common law if its negligence were unrelated to
the management of its subsidiary, Flour Mills. However, Chickasha's negli-
gence involved acts connected with the operation of Flour Mills. The plain-
tiff had alleged Chickasha failed to perform the employer's duty of providing
a safe workplace, or to enforce this duty on the employer. The Tenth Circuit
was unwilling to extend liability for an employer's nondelegable duty of
maintaining the work premises to a shareholder, even a controlling share-
holder such as a parent corporation.18 ' Chickasha was held to be immune
from tort liability under the Compensation Act, and the action's dismissal
was affirmed.
The Workmen's Compensation Act of Kansas 182 was examined in
Fowler v. Interstate Brands Corp. ,i83 to determine when an independent con-
tractor's employee may bring a common law tort claim against a principal
174. Id. at 1059.
175. Id. at 1060 (quoting Arrington v. Michigan-Wisconsin Pipeline Co., 632 F.2d 867, 871
(10th Cir. 1980)).
176. 647 F.2d at 1061.
177. Id.
178. Coco v. Winston Indus., Inc., 330 So. 2d 649 (La. App. 1975), revldon othergrwunds, 341
So. 2d 332 (La. 1976).
179. See, rg., Boggs v. Blue Diamond Coal Co., 590 F.2d 655 (6th Cir.), cert. denid, 444 U.S.
836 (1979); Latham v. Technar, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 1031 (E.D. Tenn. 1974); Foley v. New York
City Omnibus Corp., 112 N.Y.S.2d 217 (1952).
180. 647 F.2d at 1062.
181. Id.
182. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-501 (Supp. 1980).
183. No. 79-1538 (10th Cir. Dec. 22, 1980) (not for routine publication).
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employer. The issue was similar to that raised in Arrington 18 4-whether re-
covery against a principal is limited to the remedies in the Compensation
Act-but the Fowler court's analysis, using a two-prong test under Kansas
law, is more exacting. 185
When a member of the principal employer's maintenance crew short-
circuited the plant's electrical system, the plaintiff, employee of an independ-
ent contractor, was called in to assist the principal employer in making re-
pairs. Before the plaintiff could complete his work, the main electrical
distribution plant exploded, injuring him. 186
The trial court granted summary judgment in the principal employer's
favor. The plaintiff appealed on the ground that a principal employer is
protected from suit under the Compensation Act only if the work performed
by the independent contractor was part of the principal employer's trade or
business.' 8 7 The plaintiff maintained that repairing the plant's electrical
system was not an integral part of the principal employer's business or
trade. "8
The court concluded that under the facts of this case, plant repair was
part of the principal employer's regular activity. Therefore, the independent
contractor's employee and the principal employer stood in a statutory em-
ployee/employer relationship, and the employee's sole remedy arose under
the Kansas Workmen's Compensation Act. 189 The court's conclusions were
buttressed by the fact that the plant's operation required complex machin-
ery and that consequently, the principal employer's staff included a full-
time, twenty-five member maintenance and engineering crew, for routine
upkeep and repair services necessary to production. 90 These factors satis-
fied the two-pronged test that the court set forth to determine whether the
principal employer stood as a third party or as the statutory employer of the
184. See text accompanying notes 160-67 supra.
185. The Kansas Supreme Court had announced a two-pronged test for determining
whether a worker will be considered a statutory employee. If either part of the test is met, the
worker's sole recourse is the Compensation Act. Under the test of Hanna v. CRA, Inc., 196
Kan. 156, 409 P.2d 786 (1966):
1. The work being performed by the independent contractor and the injured em-
ployee must have been necessarily inherent in and an integral part of the principal's
trade or business, or
2. that work must have been such as would ordinarily have been done by an em-
ployee of the principal.
No. 79-1538, slip op. at 6 (citing Hanna v. CRA, Inc., 196 Kan. at 159-60, 409 P.2d at 789).
186. No. 79-1538, slip op. at 4.
187. Id., slip op. at 2. The applicable provision was KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-503(a) (Supp.
1980), which provides:
(a) Where any person (in this section referred to as principal) undertakes to execute
any work which is a part of his trade or business or which he has contracted to perform
and contracts with any other person (in this section referred to as the contractor) for
the execution by or under the contractor of the whole or any part of the work under-
taken by the principal, the principal shall be liable to pay to any workman employed
in the execution of the work any compensation under the workmen's compensation act
which he would have been liable to pay if that workman had been immediately em-
ployed by him ....
See a/so Hanna v. CRA, Inc., 196 Kan. 156, 409 P.2d 786 (1966).
188. No. 79-1538, slip op. at 7.
189. Id., slip op. at 8.
190. Id., slip op. at 4.
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worker.'91 The court affirmed the district court's ruling that both tests were
met, and that the principal employer was immune from common-law tort
liability. 192
B. Workers' Compensation and the Federal Tort Claims Act
Employees of independent contractors hired by the federal government,
as well as individuals entering into the service of the federal government,
may come within the ambit of the exclusive remedy provisions of Compensa-
tion Acts.
The availability of the exclusive remedy provision of the Kansas Work-
men's Compensation Act 19 3 as a defense to a negligence claim against the
United States was determined in Grz/lm v. United States. 194 An employee of a
contractor for a federal agency brought suit pursuant to the Federal Tort
Claims Act (FTCA) 195 for injuries sustained in the course of employment.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judg-
ment. Under the FTCA, the United States stands in the same position as a
private citizen in the suit, and may pursue the same defenses as any private
party under state law.196 The court recognized that in theory, the protec-
tions afforded a worker is substantially undercut because a state may not
require the federal government to obtain workmen's compensation insur-
ance. 19 7 However, the agency contract in this instance required the contrac-
tor to obtain the insurance; thus, the court was satisfied as to the worker's
ability to obtain compensation for his injuries. 198 Since the United States
indirectly paid for the insurance, the court felt that the policies of the FTCA
and the Kansas Workmen's Compensation Act were fulfilled by allowing the
United States to assert the "exclusive remedy" defense. The Tenth Circuit
declined to extend this holding to the situation in which insurance had not
been purchased.' 99
The court then examined the factual issue previously discussed in Fowler
v. Interstate Brands Corp. ,200 whether the contractor's work was integral to the
191. See note 185 supra. The court commented that isolated events not constituting the
business of the principal employer, such as the erection of a building, would not give the princi-
pal employer status as a statutory employer of the independent contractor's employees. No. 79-
1538, slip op. at 9-11.
192. No. 79-1538, slip op. at 12. The plaintiff also argued that his technical expertise pre-
cluded his labor from being an integral part of the principal employer's business, as his work
normally would not have been performed by the plant's own employees. Id., slip op. at 8. The
court dismissed this argument on the facts, namely, that the plaintiff was not called in for his
expertise, but to relieve the plant's employees. Id., slip op. at 9. The court also rejected the
argument that the business conducted must be the employer's main or primary business in order
to be immune from tort liability. Id., slip op. at 11-12.
193. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-501 (Supp. 1980).
194. 644 F.2d 846 (10th Cir. 1981).
195. Ch. 753, Title IV, 60 Stat. 842 (1946) (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
196. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2674 (1976). See Scoggin v. United States, 444 F.2d 74, 75 (10th
Cir. 1971); Gov't Employees Ins. Co. v. United States, 349 F.2d 83, 85 (10th Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 1026 (1966).
197. 644 F.2d at 847-48.
198. Id. at 848.
199. Id.
200. No. 79-1538 (10th Cir. Dec. 22, 1980) (not for routine publication).
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business of the principal employer, in this case "a hypothetical private party
in the position of the GSA."'20 The United States was found to have stood
in the same position of liability as an independent contractor, on the basis of
affidavits and a deposition presented as evidence, and was thus entitled to
raise the "exclusive remedy" defense.
20 2
In Hudburgh v. United States ,203 the Tenth Circuit ordered the trial court
to abate further consideration of an action under the FTCA,2 0 4 pending de-
termination of the issue of whether a Reserve Officers Training Corps
(ROTC) trainee must seek relief under the Federal Employees Compensa-
tion Act (FECA)20 5 first. The plaintiff, enrolled in the ROTC, was seriously
injured during a drill session.
20 6
The court ordered the action to be abated because it agreed with the
district court that the complaint presented the possibility of FECA's applica-
bility.2 0 7 The plaintiff was directed to adopt the procedure prescribed by
the Fifth Circuit 20 8 pending final resolution of his remedies under FECA.
VIII. PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT, AS
APPLIED TO UNITED STATES AGENCIES
In Reynolds v. United States,20 9 the Tenth Circuit addressed itself to the
sufficiency of a complaint stating a claim against the federal government.
The plaintiffs' neighbors had received financial assistance through the Farm-
ers Home Administration (FmHA) to construct a residence. 210 In accord-
ance with federal regulations, 21' the FmHA county inspector visited the
residence several times during construction to inspect and approve the struc-
ture. After completion, the plaintiffs' son was watching the house while the
owners were away, and was poisoned by carbon monoxide gas, suffering se-
vere brain damage. The plaintiffs sought to recover damages from the gov-
ernment for negligent inspection of the house's furnace system.
212
The district court dismissed the action, finding the FmHA owed no
duty of ordinary care to FmHA borrowers' invitees.213 The Tenth Circuit
201. 644 F.2d at 848. Like the Fowter court, the court in Grtffm reiterated the Hanna test. See
note 185 supra and accompanying text.
202. 644 F.2d at 848.
203. 626 F.2d 813 (10th Cir. 1980).
204. 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (1976).
205. 5 U.S.C. § 8101 (1976). See Reep v. United States, 557 F.2d 204 (9th Cir. 1977), which
holds that if a plaintiffs injuries may be compensable by the FECA, the plaintiff cannot sue
under the FTCA.
206. 626 F.2d at 814.
207. Id. The court also agreed with the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiff's petition for a
writ of mandamus, since "mandamus is not intended to be used for unliquidated money dam-
ages." Id.
208. Concordia v. United States Postal Service, 585 F.2d 731 (5th Cir. 1978).
209. 643 F.2d 707 (10th Cir.), cert. denid, No. 80-2064 (Oct. 5, 1981).
210. Id. at 708. The court pointed out that the statutory objective of FmHa assistance is
"the realization ... of the goal of a decent home and a suitable living environment for every
American family. ... 643 F.2d at 710 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1970)).
211. 7 C.F.R. §§ 1804.3(d)(1), 18 04.4(g)(3) (1980) (current version at 7 C.F.R. §§ 1804.64,
1804.73 (1981)).
212. 643 F.2d at 708.
213. 643 F.2d at 708-09.
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affirmed the decision on other grounds. In avoiding the issue of whether any
duty was owed to the plaintiffs, the court focused on a specific statutory
exception to the FTCA: misrepresentation. 21 4 The Supreme Court, in
United States v. Neustadt,21 5 had held that an inaccurate FmHA inspection
and appraisal is the basis for a claim for misrepresentation, and thus is not
actionable under the FTCA.2 1 6 This position has been followed in several
circuits. 2 7 Finally, the court noted that sovereign immunity waivers must
be construed in favor of the government. 2 "1  The misrepresentation excep-
tion is deemed to include "false representations of any type."'2 19 Conse-
quently, the plaintiffs had no claim against the government, since the court
considered their claim to be one of misrepresentation by the FmHA, and not
of negligence.
22 0
Strict construction under the FTCA also extends to the two-year statute
of limitations. 22 ' In Robbins v. United States ,222 the court determined when a
cause of action would accrue under the FTCA. The test, announced by the
Supreme Court in United States v. Kubrick,22 3 establishes that the plaintiff's
cause of action accrues once he knows "both the existence and the cause of
his injury." 224 This test expressly overrules prior decisions holding that a
cause of action accrues once a claimant knows that medical malpractice may
have occurred.
225
Robbins had developed a skin condition and, as the dependent of an
Air Force officer, contacted a base physician. The drug prescribed for him
caused an additional skin disorder. After consultation with another physi-
cian, he was advised to discontinue use of the drug. Four years later, he was
told the condition could become permanent. He then filed an administra-
tive claim under the FTCA.
226
The court determined that the claimant's cause of action accrued
shortly after his awareness that the drug caused his injury.22 7 The running
of the two-year statute of limitations was not tolled by the minority of the
claimant. 228 "[A] legally cognizable injury will begin the running of the
statutory period . . .even though the ultimate damage is unknown or un-
predictable; '229 hence, Robbins' ignorance of the permanency of his injury
214. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1976).
215. 366 U.S. 696 (1961).
216. Id. at 708.
217. &e, e.g., Moon v. Takisaki, 501 F.2d 389 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. Longo, 464
F.2d 913 (8th Cir. 1972); Edelman v. FHA, 382 F.2d 594 (2d Cir. 1967).
218. 643 F.2d at 713 (citing Hurley v. United States, 624 F.2d 93 (loth Cir. 1980)).
219. 643 F.2d at 712. See Hall v. United States, 274 F.2d 69 (10th Cir. 1959).
220. 643 F.2d at 712. Set Irzyk v. United States, 412 F.2d 749 (10th Cir. 1969).
221. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (1976). This provision imposes a two-year statute of limitations on
actions against the government.
222. 624 F.2d 971 (10th Cir. 1980).
223. 444 U.S. 111 (1979).
224. Id. at 113.
225. 624 F.2d at 972.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 973.
228. Id. at 972.
229. Id. at 973.
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did not delay the running of the limitations period. 230
IX. OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH AGENCY
In reviewing four actions brought by employers against the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Agency (OSHA), the Tenth Circuit twice affirmed
and twice reversed the agency's decisions. None of the decisions evinces the
level of deference normally accorded agency action.
The Tenth Circuit reversed the Occupational Safety and Health Re-
view Commission (Commission) in Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co.
v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'sst'on,231 determining that the
agency acted arbitrarily232 in finding Mountain Bell liable for a serious vio-
lation of a safety regulation. 233 The reversal on review was based upon the
agency's erroneous allocation of the burden of proof with regard to safety
violations.
234
Mountain Bell sent two employees, a supervisor and an apprentice, to
install telephone lines on a utility pole. During the installation the supervi-
sor, who had not worn the protective rubber gloves required when exposed
to high voltage lines, was fatally electrocuted. Because of this accident,
Mountain Bell was cited for a serious violation of OSHA safety standards.
The ALJ vacated the citation, finding that Mountain Bell did not know of
the violation. The Commission reversed on the ground that the knowledge
of a supervisory employee is imputed to the employer.235 In effect, the Com-
mission shifted the burden of proof so that Mountain Bell had to demon-
strate that the accident was unpreventable.
The court found the shift of the burden of proof to be untenable in light
of the Commission's rule concerning the allocation of the burden of proof.
236
It is reasonable to impute to an employer a supervisory employee's knowl-
edge of subordinate employees' safety violations, if the supervisory employee
has been entrusted with the task of ensuring compliance with safety stan-
dards.23 7 However, imputing a supervisory employee's knowledge of his own
wrongdoing to his principal, for the purposes of demonstrating a violation of
a safety standard, would allow OSHA to establish a prima facie case against
the principal merely by showing that a violation occurred.238 The Tenth
Circuit aligned itself with the Fourth Circuit in rejecting such an allocation
of the burden of proof.
239
In R.A. Pohl Constructzn Co. v. Marshall ,24 the Tenth Circuit partly re-
230. Id.
231. 623 F.2d 155 (10th Cir. 1980).
232. Arbitrary action is defined under the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1976).
233. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.132(a) (1980).
234. 623 F.2d at 157-58.
235. Id. at 157.
236. Id. (citing Commission Rule 73(a), 29 C.F.R. § 2200.73(a) (1980)). This rule requires
the Secretary to prove all elements of a violation. See Brennan v. Occupational Safety & Health
Review Comm'n, 511 F.2d 1139 (9th Cir. 1975).
237. 623 F.2d at 158.
238. Id.
239. Id See, e.g., Ocean Elec. Corp. v. Secretary of Labor, 594 F.2d 396 (4th Cir. 1979).
240. 640 F.2d 266 (10th Cir. 1981).
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versed an order of the Commission and took issue with an unsupported de-
termination by an ALJ of the soil conditions at an accident scene. The
determination became part of the record on the day the decision was ren-
dered, not prior to or during the hearing, and concerned a fact which neither
the agency nor the petitioner had addressed. On the basis of the determina-
tion, one of the charges against the employer was amended after the decision
was handed down. 241' The issue on review was whether the amendment of
the agency citation from violation of one standard to violation of another,
after the hearing had concluded, was valid if not expressly or impliedly con-
sented to by the employer.
242
The Tenth Circuit found that without the express or implied consent of
an employer, no additional standard of violation could be used to sustain
any sanctions against that employer. Such consent is present where the em-
ployer had the opportunity to adequately address the allegations of the
amended citation.
243
The court determined that the ALJ had gone beyond the scope of the
litigation in changing the charge against the employer to one not raised in
the Commission citation.244 An agency's citation must be considered in the
same light as a citation for a criminal offense: it must clearly convey the
charges against the employer so that an adequate defense may be prepared.
A case cannot be "tried on one regulation or standard and decided on an-
other." 24 5 The only amendment permissible is that to which the employer
has consented by reason of having had an adequate opportunity to address it
during the proceedings.
246
In contrast to the Pohl case, the court in P.A.F Equipment Co. v. Occupa-
tional Safety &Health Review Commission247 affirmed the amendment of a cita-
tion upgrading the charge from a willful to a serious violation. The ALJ had
determined the amendment was improper. The Commission reversed the
ALJ's decision on review. In upholding the increase in penalty, the court
emphasized its previous decisions in Clarkson Constructon Co. v. Occupational
Safety & Health Review Commission24 8 and Savina Home Industries v. Secretay of
Labor. 249
241. The employer was deemed to have violated 29 C.F.R. § 1926.652(b) (1980), rather
than 29 C.F.R. § 1926.652(c) (1980), as previously alleged. Both pertain to violations of trench-
ing standards in certain types of soil. 640 F.2d at 267.
242. 640 F.2d at 267. Rule 15(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits amend-
ments to the pleadings to include issues not raised therein if the issues were addressed by the
parties during trial. The amendments are considered to have received the implied or express
consent of the parties. Ellis v. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co., 609 F.2d 436 (10th Cir. 1979). This
rule is adopted under the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 661(o (1976).
243. 640 F.2d at 267.
244. Id. at 268.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 267.
247. 634 F.2d 741 (10th Cir. 1981).
248. 531 F.2d 451 (10th Cir. 1976). The Carkson court held that the commission may in-
crease penalties so long as there is no vindictiveness and the right to judicial review remains
intact. Id. at 456.
249. 594 F.2d 1358, 1366 (10th Cir. 1979) (the Commission's penalty-modifying power does
not constitute a violation of due process).
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In Marshall u. Horn Seed Co., 250 the Tenth Circuit considered the grounds
for the issuance of an administrative warrant to inspect. 25 I An OSHA com-
pliance officer petitioned the district court for a search warrant based upon
unverified complaints from anonymous sources. The district court granted
the application. The respondent company refused to honor the warrant, and
the agency obtained an order to show cause why the company should not be
held in contempt. After a hearing, the district court quashed the warrant,
finding no probable cause sufficient to sustain it.252 The Tenth Circuit
agreed, and proceeded to discuss the level of probable cause necessary to
sustain an administrative search warrant.
253
Neither of the sections in the Occupational Safety and Health Act au-
thorizing inspection of the workplace for occupational hazards requires a
search warrant. 25 4 The Supreme Court imposed the search warrant require-
ment on nonconsensual OSHA inspections in Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.
255
The Barlow's, Inc. decision affirmed previous Supreme Court holdings256 that
administrative probable cause requires a standard less stringent than that
applied to criminal cases. The Tenth Circuit followed these holdings, and
ruled that OSHA inspections require a showing of administrative probable
cause.25 7 Under the Barlow's, Inc. standard, the Secretary of Labor can
demonstrate probable cause by presenting specific evidence of an existing
violation.
258
In determining the level of scrutiny required for an administrative
search warrant based on evidence of a safety violation, the Tenth Circuit
imposed an intermediate standard:
[Tihe magistrate need not have a reasonable belief that a violation
wi/I be found. Nor need he even find it more probable than not that a
violation will be uncovered. . . . [T]here must be some plausible
basis for believing that a violation is h'ce/y to be found.
259
In essence, the court requested that the magistrate assure that the com-
plaint and the resulting search warrant do not rely entirely upon an un-
250. 647 F.2d 96 (10th Cir. 1981).
251. The Occupational Health and Safety Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 657(0 (1976) authorizes
an inspection when an employee believes "that a violation of a safety or health standard exists
that threatens physical harm .... Id.
252. 647 F.2d at 98.
253. Id. at 98-104.
254. 29 U.S.C. § 657(a), (0(1) (1976).
255. 436 U.S. 307 (1978). In Barltowr, Inc., the Supreme Court distinguished the level of
probable cause necessary in criminal proceedings from that in administrative proceedings. The
Court found:
For purposes of an administrative search .. probable cause justifying the issuance of
a warrant may be based not only on specific evidence of an existing violation but also
on a showing that 'reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting
. . . an inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular [establishment].'
Id. at 320 (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538 (1967) (footnote omitted)).
This requirement is different from the showing of probable cause necessary in a criminal con-
text. See Marshall v. W.W. Steel Co., 604 F.2d 1322, 1326 (10th Cir. 1979).
256. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538-39 (1967); See v. City of Seattle, 387
U.S. 541, 545 (1967).
257. 647 F.2d at 102.
258. Id. at 103 (citing Barlowt's, Inc., 436 U.S. at 320).
259. 647 F.2d at 102 (emphasis in the original).
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named source whose credibility cannot be challenged. 26° The Horn Seed
search warrant was deemed insufficient because the affiant simply stated
that a complaint was received and detailed the alleged unsafe conditions.
She did not identify the source of the complaint 26 1 or describe the underly-
ing facts and circumstances surrounding the complaint.
262
In dicta, the court explained that a warrant may also be sought to con-
duct inspections pursuant to a general administrative plan, where no specific
violation is alleged. Such a warrant need not be questioned as to the relia-
bility of its source or the probability of a violation. It needs merely to be
reasonable and to conform to guidelines designed to protect individuals from
arbitrary agency action.
26 3
X. THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION
The Tenth Circuit published two unrelated decisions affirming the In-
terstate Commerce Commission (ICC) in its exercise of authority. In gen-
eral, the decisions upheld the reasonable actions of the agency in any good
faith undertaking to fulfill its congressional mandate.
264
In Graves Truck Line, Inc. v..* ICC, 2 6 5 the Tenth Circuit rendered a narrow
opinion on the jurisdiction, under the revised Interstate Commerce Act
(ICA),266 of federal and state licensing authorities over intrastate carriers.
The Act provides that an intrastate carrier, upon receipt of a state certificate
of public convenience and necessity, may apply to the ICC for registration to
enable it to handle goods moving in interstate commerce.2 6 7 A Kansas car-
rier, Winters Truck Line, Inc., became certified and registered under this
provision, then sought additional certification through the Kansas Corpora-
260. Id. at 103.
261. Id. The source need not be identified specifically, but information should be given as
to whether the source is an employee, competitor, customer, visitor, etc. Id.
262. 647 F.2d at 103.
263. Id. at 100-01.
264. The Tenth Circuit also decided two ICC cases dealing with standards of reviewing
ICC interpretations and grants of certificates of public convenience and necessity to carriers.
Missouri, Kansas, and Oklahoma Coach Lines, Inc. v. ICC, No. 80-1535 (10th Cir. November
10, 1980) (not for routine publication); Pack Transport, Inc. v. United States, No. 77-1967 (10th
Cir. Sept. 12, 1980) (not for routine publication).
265. 637 F.2d 757 (10th Cir. 1980).
266. 49 U.S.C. § 10101 (Supp. III 1979).
267. Id. § 10931 provides:
(a) A motor common carrier may provide transportation subject to the jurisdic-
tion of the Interstate Commerce Commission under subchapter II of chapter 105 of
this title without a certificate issued by the Commission under section 10922 of this
title, when-
(1) the carrier provides transportation entirely in one State;
(2) the carrier is not controlled by, controlling, or under common control
with a carrier providing transportation outside the State;
(3) the carrier has applied for, and has been issued, a certificate of public
convenience and necessity by the State authority having jurisdiction to issue such
a certificate, permitting the carrier to provide intrastate transportation by motor
vehicle; and
(4) the intrastate certificate was issued after, and the certificate states
that-
(A) notice was given to interested parties through publication in the
Federal Register of the filing of the application by the carrier and the desire
of the carrier to provide transportation otherwise under the jurisdiction of
19821
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tion Commission (KCC) several years later, in order to extend its intrastate
authority and to have the extension applied to the transportation of inter-
state shipments. The petitioners, Graves Truck Lines, Inc. and Santa Fe
Trail Transportation Co., challenged the application on the basis that Win-
ters did not operate entirely intrastate, as required by the ICA provision26R
under which Winters registered with the ICC, and that "public convenience
and necessity" was not served by allowing Winters to transport interstate
shipments. 26 9 The KCC rejected the petitioners' contentions and granted
Winters' application. Based on the KCC's grant, the ICC gave Winters a
certificate of registration, again over the petitioners' objections.
270
The petitioners appealed on the basis that Winters' original ICC regis-
tration included "commercial zones" 2 71 extending outside the state, which
precluded Winters from valid KCC registration as an intrastate carrier. The
ICC, however, maintained that any possible defect in the original ICC certif-
icate was cured by a restrictive order issued shortly before Winters applied to
the KCC for extension of its authority. This restrictive order eliminated
the Commission within the limits of the certificate issued by the State au-
thority;
(B) reasonable opportunity to be heard was given; and
(C) the State authority considered and found that the public conven-
ience and necessity require that the carrier be permitted to provide transpor-
tation under the jurisdiction of the Commission within limits that do not
exceed the scope of the certificate issued by the State authority.
(b) An interested party that opposed issuing the certificate to a motor common
carrier in a proceeding before a State authority may petition the Commission for re-
consideration of a decision of the State authority. On reconsideration, the Commis-
sion, based on the record before the State authority, may affirm, reverse, or change
that decision, but only with respect to the transportation subject to Commission juris-
diction.
(c) The Commission may require, before a motor common carrier provides
transportation authorized under this section, that-
(I) a certified copy of the carrier's intrastate certificate and other appropri-
ate information be filed with the Commission; and
(2) the carrier comply with applicable requirements established by the
Commission.
(d)(1) The Commission shall issue a certificate of registration to a motor com-
mon carrier authorizing the carrier to provide transportation under this section. The
authority granted under the certificate is subject to all other applicable provisions of
this subtitle. Except as otherwise provided in this subsection and subchapter III of
chapter 113 of this title, the certificate of registration may be transferred if it is trans-
ferred with the intrastate certificate. Transfer of the intrastate certificate without the
certificate of registration revokes the certificate of registration.
(2) The certificate of registration issued by the Commission is valid as long as
the motor common carrier provides transportation entirely in the State from which it
received its intrastate certificate and is not controlled by, controlling, or under com-
mon control with, a carrier providing transportation outside the State.
(e)(1) On the 180th day after the termination, restriction in scope, or suspension
of the intrastate certificate, the authority granted under this section to provide trans-
portation is revoked or likewise restricted unless the intrastate certificate is renewed or
reissued or the restriction is removed by that 180th day.
(2) Transportation authorized under this section may be suspended or revoked
by the Commission under section 10925 of this title.
268. d.
269. 637 F.2d at 759.
270. Id.
271. A "commercial zone" is defined as a zone "adjacent to, and commercially a part of" a
municipality. 49 U.S.C. § 10526(b)(1) (Supp. III 1979). ICC regulations determine the extent
of the zone according to the population of the municipality. 49 C.F.R. § 1048.101 (1980).
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from Winters' ICC registration any territories outside Kansas. 272 Addition-
ally, Winters argued that its single-state status was intact as it in fact never
engaged in transport outside Kansas.
2 73
The court concluded that the ICC's intervening restrictive order re-
solved all doubt as to Winters' qualification for intrastate registration under
the ICA.2 74 Thus, the KCC and the ICC had properly exercised jurisdiction
in granting Winters' applications for registration.
275
In Midwestern Transportation, Inc. v. ICC,2 7 6 the court considered the
ICC's application of regular route versus alternative route criteria in the
grant of a certificate of public convenience and necessity. 2 77 The applicant,
Graves Truck Line, Inc., had been issued a certificate of authority for use of
a circuitous route between two cities, and sought certification for an addi-
tional direct route. The certificate was granted in view of the substantial
cost savings which would accrue to Graves in terms of driver time and fuel
expenditures. The petitioners, two of the other twelve carriers authorized on
the direct route, brought an action claiming the application, filed as a regu-
lar route application, was improperly prosecuted and treated as an alternate
route application and could not be sustained under the decisional criteria
adopted by the ICC for proving the need for a direct route.278 Further, the
petitioners asserted that the ICC's decision was arbitrary and capricious and
could not be sustained even if the correct criteria had been applied. 279 The
272. 637 F.2d at 759.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 760.
275. Id.
276. 635 F.2d 771 (10th Cir. 1980).
277. Such a grant is pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 10922 (Supp. I1 1979), which provides:
(a) Except as provided in this section and 10930(a) of this title, the Interstate Com-
merce Commission shall issue a certificate to a person authorizing that person to pro-
vide transportation subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission under subchapter II
or III of chapter 105 of this title as a motor common carrier or water common carrier,
respectively, if the Commission finds that
(1) the person is fit, willing, and able
(A) to provide the transportation to be authorized by the certificate; and
(B) to comply with this subtitle and regulations.of the Commission; and
(2) the transportation to be provided under the certificate is or will be requir-
ed by the present or future public convenience and necessity.
Regular route and alternative route criteria were distinguished in Cooper's Express, Inc.,
51 M.C.C. 411 (1950):
We have consistently recognized a distinction between the measure of proof required
to sustain the granting of an application seeking authority to improve an existing and
competitively effective service and one seeking authority to institute a new service. In
determining these so-called alternate route applications, the essential issue presented is
whether applicant actually engaged in the transportation of traffic, in substantial
volumes, between the termini of the proposed alternate or direct route and is at pres-
ent in a position effectively to compete with other carriers for such traffic, or whether
the new route will enable applicant either to institute a new service not theretofore
conducted, or to institute a service so different from that theretofore provided as mate-
rially to alter the competitive situation to the injury of existing carriers. In the case of
the former, we are justified in granting the authority sought solely upon proof that the
proposed operation would result in operating economies, which, although primarily a
benefit to the applicant, result in an indirect benefit to the public through the medium
of more efficient service.
Id. at 414.
278. 635 F.2d at 773-74.
279. Id. at 775.
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ICC contended that it applied the correct criteria in granting Graves' appli-
cation, and that its decision benefitted the public.
28 0
The court agreed that the application, although filed as a regular route
service application, was prosecuted as an alternative route certification.
However, the court decided that Graves fulfilled the criteria required for a
regular route certificate. 28 ' In affirming the Commission, the Tenth Circuit
relied upon the criteria for regular and alternative route certification, 28 2 as
well as the impact of the National Transportation Policy 28 3 on the regula-
tory powers of the ICC. The court also looked to an ICC policy statement
28 4
that eliminated as a criterion the adequacy of existing services such as those
provided by the petitioners, Graves' competitors. Final rejection of the peti-
tioners' position28 5 was based on the Supreme Court's pronouncement in
Bowman Transportation, Inc. v. Arkansas Best Freight System, Inc.,286 where the
Supreme Court found that the purpose of the ICC, in granting certificates of
public convenience and necessity, is to promote the needs of the public while
balancing the competing interests.
28 7
XI. THE DEFINITION OF "CONSUMER PRODUCT"
In Bell Enterprises, Inc. v. Consumer Product Safety Commission ,288 the Tenth
Circuit considered whether an amusement park ride is a "consumer prod-
uct" within the meaning of the Consumer Product Safety Act.2 8 9 The court
held that an amusement park "Skyride" is not a "consumer product" as de-
fined in the Act.
The case resulted from an accident involving an amusement park ride
280. Id.
281. Id. at 777.
282. See note 277 supra.
283. 49 U.S.C. § 10101(a)(Supp. III 1979) provides:
(a) To ensure the development, coordination, and preservation of a transportation
system that meets the transportation needs of the United States, including the United
States Postal Service and national defense, it is the policy of the United States Govern-
ment to provide for the impartial regulation of the modes of transportation subject to
this subtitle, and in regulating those modes
(1) to recognize and preserve the inherent advantage of each mode of trans-
portation;
(2) to promote safe, adequate, economical and efficient transportation;
(3) to encourage sound economic conditions in transportation, including
sound economic conditions among carriers;
(4) to encourage the establishment and maintenance of reasonable rates for
transportation without unreasonable discrimination or unfair or destructive com-
petitive practices;
(5) to cooperate with each State and the officials of each State on transpor-
tation matters; and
(6) to encourage fair wages and working conditions in the transportation
industry.
(b) this subtitle shall be administered and enforced to carry out the policy of this
section.
284. 44 Fed. Reg. 60,296 (1979).
285. 635 F.2d at 777.
286. 419 U.S. 281 (1974).
287. 635 F.2d at 777 (quoting Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419
U.S. at 283).
288. 645 F.2d 26 (10th Cir. 1981).
289. 15 U.S.C. § 2051 (1976).
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in Texas, which sparked an investigation of such rides. The "Skyride" in-
volved in the case was an aerial cable tram of a type in general use in amuse-
ment parks. The Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) sent a
letter to Bell Enterprises in Tulsa, Oklahoma, requesting information about
a "Skyride" Bell Enterprises was operating in its amusement park. The let-
ter warned that a failure to provide information could subject Bell Enter-
prises to penalties up to $500,000, and also could subject individuals to
criminal penalties. 290 Bell Enterprises then sought a declaratory judgment
that the Consumer Product Safety Act was unconstitutional in regard to the
investigatory authority it bestowed on the CPSC, and inapplicable to amuse-
ment parks and to their rides since, according to Bell Enterprises, the rides
were not "consumer products" over which the CPSC had jurisdiction.
29 '
The lower court held that the Skyride was a consumer product over which
the CPSC had jurisdiction, and that Bell Enterprises' constitutional rights
had not been violated. Bell Enterprises appealed.
292
The court of appeals listed several cases where courts had reached dif-
ferent results on the issue of whether Skyrides or similar rides were "con-
sumer products" within the meaning of the Act, 293 and then looked to the
Act itself for the definition of "consumer product."
The term 'consumer product' means any article, or component
part thereof, produced or distributed (i) for sale to a consumer for
use in or around a permanent or temporary household or residence,
a school, in recreation, or otherwise, or (ii) for the personal use,
consumption or enjoyment of a consumer in or around a perma-
nent or temporary household or residence, a school, in recreation,
or otherwise; but such term does not include-
(A) any article which is not customarily produced or distrib-
uted for sale to, or use or consumption by, or enjoyment of, a
consumer .... 294
The legislative history of the Act indicated that clause (i) was the origi-
nal clause, defining articles produced or distributed for sale to consumers,
and that clause (ii) was added later to include articles dispensed to consum-
ers by gift, promotional samples, or other non-sale distributions. 295 The
court, pointing out that clause (ii) was added solely to cover all manner of
distribution and not to expand the class of articles defined in clause (i),
maintained that the language of clause (i), not the term "enjoyment" in
290. 645 F.2d at 27.
291. Id.
292. Id Se Bell Enterprises, Inc. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 484 F. Supp. 1221
(N.D. Okla. 1980), retvd, 645 F.2d 26 (10th Cir. 1981).
293. 645 F.2d at 27; See State Fair of Texas v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 481 F.
Supp. 1070 (N.D. Tex. 1979), mat.ifd, 650 F.2d 1324 (5th Cir.), vcatd mnn., 102 S. Ct. 560
(1981); Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. Chance Mfg. Co., 441 F. Supp. 228 (D.D.C. 1977);
Walt Disney Prods. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, No. 79-0170-LEW (Px) (C.D. Cal.
April 18, 1979), vcaed ent, 649 F.2d 870 (9th Cir. 1981).
294. 15 U.S.C. § 2052(a)(1) (1976).
295. The court added that no significance was to be attached to the term "personal" in
clause (ii), and that "personal" use in clause (ii) is equivalent to "to a consumer for use" in
clause (i). 645 F.2d at 28.
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clause (ii), determined the definition of a "consumer product. ' 296 The court
disagreed with the CPSC's interpretation, which would have defined a "con-
sumer product" so broadly as to include "any article which the consumer
enjoys."' 29 7 In support of its position that clause (ii) does not broaden the
clause (i) definition of a consumer product, the court cited a District of Co-
lumbia Circuit case, ASG Industries v. Consumer Product Safety Commission ,298 for
the proposition that both clauses, read together, were designed to ensure that
the definition of a "consumer product" does not depend on the mode of
distribution by which an article reaches a consumer.
2 99
The Bell Enterprises court then pointed out that another aspect of this
definition lay in the places and purposes stated in the Act. Thus, a consumer
product is one purchased or distributed for use, generally, in the places and
for the purposes stated in clauses (i) and (ii), 1'e., for use in households, resi-
dences, or schools, for purposes of recreation "or otherwise.
' 3° °
The definition is clarified further by the exclusion in subdivision (A) of
articles "not customarily produced or distributed for sale to, or use or con-
sumption by. . .a consumer." 30 1 Therefore, a product customarily sold "to
an industrial or commercial enterprise which had the exclusive control and
possession of the article in its use" is not a consumer product under the
Act. 30 2 The District of Columbia Circuit had considered this exception
clause in Consumer Product Safety Commission v. Anaconda Co.3°3 Like the Ana-
conda court, the Tenth Circuit in Be/lEnterprses deemed the "separately-sold-
to-consumers" aspect to be a factor in determining whether a Skyride was a
consumer product.
304
Another factor considered was whether the article, when used, is under
the control and direction of the user. The court inferred this requirement
from the inclusion of articles for use in household, residences, or schools, in
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. 593 F.2d 1323 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Flat Glass Ass'n of Japan v. Consumer
Prod. Safety Comm'n, 444 U.S. 864 (1979).
299. Id. at 1328.
300. 645 F.2d at 28-29. The court observed that much thought went into the definition of
"consumer product" in the Act:
It should be noticed that in (i), as well as in (ii), the description changes within each
phrase from one directed top/ace of use to how the article is- used. Since this division or
contrast is evident and was repeated, it is of importance. The "where" element-any
article produced or distributed for use "in or around a ... household, or residence,"
and the "how" element-for use "in recreation, or otherwise," are separately stated.
Thus the articles are those produced or distributed for use (ordinarily) at the places
stated although they may be used elsewhere from time to time. They are articles
produced (ordinarily) for the purposes or uses stated.
Id. at 28-29.
301. 15 U.S.C. § 2052(a)(l)(A) (1976).
302. 645 F.2d at 29 (emphasis in original).
303. 593 F.2d 1314, 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1979). The Anaconda court had held that "consumer
products" are those "customarily sold or otherwise distributed to consumers." They require
more than an occasional sale: "there must be a significant marketing of the product as a distinct
article of commerce for sale to consumers or for the use of consumers before the product may be
considered as 'customarily' produced or distributed in that manner." The Anaconda case was
remanded to the trial court for a determination of whether the article in question was purchased
separately by consumers. Id.
304. 645 F.2d at 29.
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recreation "or otherwise." 30 5
The trial court in Bell Enterprises had decided that the Skyride was a
consumer product because it was used for recreational purposes. In deter-
mining this, the trial court relied on Consumer Product Safety Commission v.
Chance Manufacturing Co.,306 which also involved an amusement park ride,
and on State Fair of Texas v. Consumer Product Safety Commission ,37 where an
aerial tramway was held to be a consumer product. The appellate court
cited a contrary holding, Walt Disney Productions v. Consumer Product Safety Com-
mission,308 where another approach was taken in holding that a Skyride was
not a consumer product. The Walt Disney court had looked to the sections of
the Act 30 9 which require that free samples of the products be provided to the
CPSC, and that the CPSC be able to purchase the product at cost. This
could not apply to a Skyride; thus, the Skyride could not be subject to the
Act.
31 0
The Tenth Circuit in Bell Enterprises agreed that the Skyride was not a
consumer product, but its rationale was different from that used in Walt Dis-
ney Productions. The court looked to several considerations implied in the
section of the Act defining "consumer product:" 1) a "consumer product" is
defined in clause (i) of the section, and clause (ii), referring to "personal use,
consumption, or enjoyment" of a product, is not an expansion of clause
(i);3 1 1 2) a "consumer product" is one used at the places--that is, house-
holds, residences, or schools--and for the purposes stated in the Act, al-
though the latter consideration is not absolute;312 3) a "consumer product"
is one customarily produced or distributed for sale or distribution to a con-
sumer, or for his "use, consumption, or enjoyment; '3 13 4) a "consumer prod-
uct," when used, must ordinarily be in the control and possession of the
user. 3 14 After taking these factors into account, the Tenth Circuit concluded
305. Id.
306. 441 F. Supp. 228 (D.D.C. 1977). The Chance court held that a user's exposure to dan-
ger was an important factor in determining whether an article is a consumer product. The
Tenth Circuit in BellEnterprtses rejected this test, as it is not implied in the statutory definition
of a consumer product. 645 F.2d at 30.
307. 481 F. Supp. 1070 (N.D. Tex. 1979), modifed, 650 F.2d 1324 (5th Cir.), vacatedmem., 102
S. Ct. 560 (1981). The State Fair court concluded that the ride was a consumer product because
it was produced "for the personal use . . . or enjoyment" of consumers "in recreation." This
court, like the Chance court, also held that in the statutory section defining "consumer product,"
the term "in recreation" did not modify the preceding phrase "in or around . . . a household."
Id. at 1077.
308. No. 79-0170-LEW (Px) (C.D. Cal. April 18, 1979), vacatednem., 649 F.2d 870 (9th Cir.
1981).
309. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2066(b), 2076(o (1976).
310. 645 F.2d at 30. The Tenth Circuit Court went on to mention two cases not involving
rides where articles were held to be consumer products. In Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp.
v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 574 F.2d 178 (3d Cir.), cert deuid, 439 U.S. 881 (1978),
aluminum wiring was found to be a consumer product because it is an article produced or
distributed for the personal use or enjoyment of consumers. In Southland Mower v. Consumer
Prod. Safety Comm'n, 619 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1980), lawn mowers were held to be governed by
CSPC safety standards if they were customarily produced or distributed for sale to, or use or
consumption by, or enjoyment of, a consumer. 645 F.2d at 30.






that a Skyride was not a consumer product, and remanded the case to the
district court for entry of judgment in favor of Bell Enterprises.3 15
Judge Weinshienk of the United States District Court for the District of
Colorado, sitting by designation, dissented. She stated her belief that the
legislative intent of adding clause (ii) to the definition was to expand the
coverage of clause (i).
Citing the Report of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce on CPSA,3 1 6 Judge Weinshienk asserted that the express intent
of the legislators in amending the definition was to extend the Act's coverage
to products principally sold to industrial or institutional buyers, so long as
they were produced or distributed for the use of consumers t.3 7 Even though
true industrial products were not intended to be covered by the Act and,
therefore, are specifically excluded from the definition of a consumer prod-
uct because they are not customarily produced or distributed for sale to or
use of consumers, 31" there are exceptions. The Committee report pointed
out that "[i]f the manufacturer or distributor of an industrial product fosters
or facilitates its sale to or use by consumers, the product may lose its claim
for exclusion if a significant number of consumers are thereby exposed to
hazards associated with the product. '3 1 9 Thus clause (ii), which covers arti-
cles for the use of consumers even though such articles may not be sold to
consumers, adds quasi-industrial products sold for consumer use to the defi-
nition of a "consumer product." Judge Weinshienk concluded that manu-
facturers and distributors selling products to industrial buyers should be
liable under the Act when the products are intended solely for consumer use,
or when consumers are exposed to hazards associated with the product.
3 20
Bell Enterprises was such an industrial buyer "because it [was] engaged in
the recreation industry and it purchased the Skyride from the Swiss manu-
facturer for the ultimate recreational use of consumers.
3 21
The dissent also differed with the majority's interpretation of the statu-
tory language designating the place and purpose of use as a criterion in de-
termining whether an article is a "consumer product. '322 Judge Weinshienk
agreed with the ASC Industries court, which held that the "enumeration of
locations and activities in which a consumer product may be used is not a
limitation on jurisdiction, but rather an assurance of comprehensiveness.
'3 23
315. Id.
316. H.R. Rep. No. 92-1153, 92 Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
317. 645 F.2d at 30-31(Weinshienk, J., dissenting).
318. Id. at 31-32.
319. H.R. Rep. No. 92-1153 at 27.
320. 645 F.2d at 32 (Weinshienk, J., dissenting).
321. Id. Judge Weinshienk did not believe that the court in ASG Industries v. Consumer
Prod. Safety Comm'n, 593 F.2d 1323 (D.C. Cir.), cert. deniedsub na. Flat Glass Ass'n of Japan v.
Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 444 U.S. 864 (1979), rejected the CPSC's position that clause
(ii) expands the clause (i) definition of a consumer product, since the ASG Industries court stated
that clause (ii) covers "products purchased by an institution for consumer use." 645 F.2d at 32
(quoting ASG Industries v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 593 F.2d at 1328). Se text accom-
panying notes 298-99 supra.
322. See text accompanying note 300 supra.
323. 645 F.2d at 32 (Weinshienk, J., dissenting) (quoting ASG Industries v. Consumer Prod.
Safety Comm'n, 593 F.2d at 1328).
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She also pointed out that Chance Manufacturing Co., which the majority opin-
ion cited, stood for the proposition that the term "in recreation or otherwise"
contemplated the use of consumer products in locations other than house-
holds, residences, and schools. 324 Hence, an amusement park could be a
place where a consumer product is used, if it is used for recreational pur-
poses. Also, because the statute used the term "or" rather than "and," Judge
Weinshienk rejected the majority's view that both the "place" and the "pur-
pose" requirements in the definition must be met, that is, that a consumer
product must be used at home or at school and for recreation or otherwise:
"I would hold that the phrase 'in recreation or otherwise' establishes an in-
dependent basis for Commission jurisdiction, and that plaintiff's aerial tram-
way meets this definitional criterion. 32 5
In light of her conclusion that the Skyride is a consumer product within
the meaning of the Act, Judge Weinshienk reached the question of the con-
stitutionality of the Act's apparent authorization of warrantless 'constructive
searches' and of the CPSC's investigative efforts. 326 She noted that the
United States Supreme Court in Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc. held that the fourth
amendment generally requires an administrative agency to obtain a warrant
before entering the premises of one refusing consent to a warrantless entry.
Even if a statute authorizes a warrantless search, an agency still must con-
form to certain procedures to avoid fourth amendment violations: "if the
agency actually obtains process which satisfies the Fourth Amendment, the
searches under the statute are permissible."
3 2 7
Judge Weinshienk felt that neither the Act nor the CPSC's investigative
efforts pursuant to the Act violated Bell Enterprises' fourth amendment
rights, since the subpoena enforcement proceedings "provide[d] the same
check on abuse of agency power as [would] an administrative search war-
rant."'3 28 Like the usual search warrant proceeding, the CPSC's proceeding
incorporated an opportunity for judicial review prior to entry, and the stan-
dard for enforcing the subpoena did not differ substantially from that re-
quired before a search warrant is issued.
329
Finally, Judge Weinshienk stated she would affirm the district court's
ruling that Bell Enterprises lacked standing to challenge the constitutional-
ity of the statutory provisions authorizing civil and criminal sanctions.
330
She commented that the CPSC letter's reference to possible sanctions "[did]
not constitute a threat of imminent and immediate prosecution and hence,
[did] not establish 'real and immediate' injury or threat of injury"' 33' that
would give Bell Enterprises standing to challenge the constitutionality of the
provisions.
324. 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
325. 645 F.2d at 32 (Weinshienk, J., dissenting).
326. Id.
327. Id. at 33 (quoting Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 325 n.23 (1978)).






XII. STANDING AND MOOTNESS
In Mountain States Legal Foundation v. CoSile,332 the Tenth Circuit dis-
missed a petition challenging the constitutional and statutory authority of
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to disapprove portions of the
Colorado air quality control implementation plan. The petition was filed by
Mountain States Legal Foundation (Mountain States), described as a non-
profit public interest law center, 333 and twenty-seven named members of the
Colorado legislature. Mountain States also claimed to represent the sover-
eign interest of the State of Colorado in an ex relatione capacity. 334 Neverthe-
less, the court ruled that in a lawsuit challenging an EPA ruling of this type,
the real party in interest is the state, by and through its attorney general.
The Colorado attorney general did not agree with most of the plaintiffs' con-
tentions; in fact, he intervened in the action and filed a brief "in direct,
absolute conflict with the contentions raised by Mountain States, '335 in
which he attacked Mountain States' standing to represent the state in an ex
re/atione capacity. Hence, the court dismissed the petition for want of stand-
ing. In so doing, the court addressed the issues of mootness and standing,
and refused to extend standing to parties lacking a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy.
336
When the Clean Air Act 337 was amended in 1977, the 1972 Colorado
State Implementation Plan (SIP), designed to implement EPA-established
ambient air-quality standards for various pollutants, had to be revised. The
amendments to the Act dealt with "nonattainment areas," .e., areas within
states that fail to meet air quality standards.338 Under these amendments,
states with nonattainment areas had to submit revised SIP's by January 1,
1979. States that appeared unable to conform to air quality control stan-
dards in the nonattainment areas by December 31, 1982, also were required
to implement an automobile emission inspection and maintenance (I/M)
program. 339 The EPA claimed the Act34° authorized it to ban new con-
struction in nonattainment areas, and to withhold federal grants and high-
way funds, if a state failed to comply with the air quality control
standards.
34 '
The EPA's ruling on Colorado's revised SIP approved it only in part. 342
The ruling stated that the Colorado Senate Bill establishing an I/M pro-
gram and commissioning a study of the effectiveness of various I/M pro-
grams was defective because it did not create "adequate enabling
authority." 343 The EPA ruling established deadlines with which the Colo-
332. 630 F.2d 754 (10th Cir. 1980), cart. denied, 450 U.S. 1050 (1981).
333. Id. at 756 n. 1.
334. Id. at 757.
335. Id. at 759.
336. Id. at 760-72.
337. 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (Supp. III 1979).
338. Id. §§ 7501-7508.
339. Id. § 7502(b)(11)(B).
340. Id. §§ 7410(a)(2)(I), 7506(a), 7616(b).
341. 630 F.2d at 757.
342. Id.
343. Id. at 758. See id. for a list of the specific deficiencies in the legislation.
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rado legislature and governor were to comply in creating an acceptable I/M
program.
3 4 4
On the deadline date, March 1, 1980, the EPA announced to the court
its intention to disapprove the carbon monoxide and ozone portions of the
Colorado SIP, to impose moratoriums on new construction of stationary
sources of these pollutants in the nonattainment areas, and to limit federal
funds.345 Mountain States then filed its petition for review, challenging the
EPA's actions as "coercive action designed to achieve specific state legislative
action," 346 and as violations of the APA, 347 the first, fifth, and tenth amend-
ments to the United States Constitution, and article IV, section 4 of the
Constitution, which guarantees a republican form of government. 348
The Colorado attorney general, representing the state, disagreed with
most of Mountain States' contentions, intervened in the lawsuit, and filed an
opposing brief. The attorney general maintained that the EPA administra-
tor acted within his statutory authority in conditionally approving Colo-
rado's SIP; that neither the first nor tenth amendments nor the due process
provisions of the fifth amendment, nor the guarantee of a republican form of
government, had been violated; and that Mountain States lacked standing
to represent the state in an ex relali'one capacity. 349 The attorney general did
argue, however, that the EPA's action in withholding federal funds before
final adjournment of the 1980 Colorado General Assembly Session would be
"arbitrary and capricious . ..because the General Assembly was making
reasonable efforts to cure the deficiencies.
' '3 5 °
The court stayed the EPA's enforcement of sanctions until after May 1,
1980, and ordered Mountain States to submit its petition for review. After
the injunction expired, the EPA administrator again imposed the funding
and construction restrictions. Five days later, the state legislature adopted
I/M legislation, which Governor Richard Lamm signed into law on May 23,
1980.35 1 The EPA notified the court that it tentatively deemed this I/M
legislation to be adequate, and that it proposed the legislation's approval as
part of the Colorado SIP.352 On May 29, 1980, the court, upon its own
motion, ordered the parties to show cause why Mountain States' appeal
should not be "dismissed for mootness. '353 The Colorado attorney general
took no position on the mootness question; the EPA urged that the action be
dismissed as moot;354 and Mountain States argued that the issues were not
344. The final deadline, however, was self-imposed by the Colorado legislature. 630 F.2d at
758.
345. 630 F.2d at 758-59.
346. Id. at 759.
347. 5 U.S.C. § 551 (1976).






354. Id. at 760. The agency pointed out that although the case would be moot technically
only after the EPA finally approved the I/M legislation, the EPA would act promptly. The
EPA added that it anticipated lifting all sanctions so that no action would be taken under
sections 176(a) and 316 of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7506(a), 7616 (Supp. III 1979).
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moot and "demanded judicial resolution. '3 55
The court first addressed the threshold issue of standing. It agreed with
the EPA and with the attorney general that Mountain States did not have
standing to sue either in its own right or on behalf of its officers, members,
and supporters.356 The critical question was whether any of the petitioners
were "aggrieved persons entitled to judicial review of final agency ac-
tion, ' 357 or had presented a sufficient case or controversy in fulfillment of
article III requirements. 35 8 The court cited Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environ-
mental Study Group359 for the proposition that "injury in fact" is the "one
constant element in judicial statements concerning standing. '360 The Tenth
Circuit's interpretation of "injury in fact" is "concrete and certain harm," 36 '
whether that harm be out-of-pocket costs to a business because of a new
governmental rule, or some other unwanted result of a governmental rule,
which result may or may not include pecuniary loss.
36 2
To have standing, a plaintiff must allege some particularized injury that
"sets him apart from the man on the street," 363 unless a specific statutory
grant of a right of review exists. 36 4 The injury must result from the defend-
ant's conduct, and "must constitute concrete and certain harm. '365 Addi-
tionally, a litigant representing the interests of third parties must
demonstrate that the agency's conduct has adversely affected him or has in-
jured those he represents.
366
The court decided that under these tests, Mountain States lacked stand-
ing because first, it lacked standing to sue in its own right. Mountain States
failed to show that the challenged EPA actions would impair its functions
and activities. 36 7 The organization did not allege it would suffer from di-
minished membership, financial losses, or other consequences due to the
EPA's actions. Also, the court ruled Mountain States could not fulfill the
requirement of section 10(a) of the APA,36 8 which grants a right of judicial
review to persons "suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or ad-
versely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a rele-
355. 630 F.2d at 760.
356. Id. at 767.
357. Id.
358. Id. at 764.
359. 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
360. 630 F.2d at 764.
361. Id.
362. Id. at 764-65 (citing Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm'r, 432 U.S. 333
(1977), and Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977)).
363. 630 F.2d at 765 (citing United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974)).
364. 630 F.2d at 765.
365. Id. (citing National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Califano, 622 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir.
1980)).
366. 630 F.2d at 765 (citing Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972) and Data Process-
ing Serv. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970)). The court then examined the standing issue with
reference to the statutory provisions under which the EPA's actions were challenged, and found
that the Clean Air Act calls for exclusive review in the courts of appeals of EPA grants or
denials of waivers to companies unable to meet clear air standards. Citizens' suits, then, are
authorized under the Act when-but only when-the EPA administrator allegedly fails to per-
form a non-discretionary duty. 630 F.2d at 765-66.
367. Id. at 767.
368. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976).
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vant statute . ,,"69 Mountain States had not shown "a sufficient
'personal stake' in the outcome of the controversy" to enable it to sue in its
own behalf as an "aggrieved person."
370
Second, even if Mountain States raised constitutional claims on behalf
of its "officers, members, supporters, and the State of Colorado," T37 ' this did
not give the organization standing. The court quoted Sierra Club v. Morton
372
for the proposition that an organization claiming to "vindicate [its] own
value preferences through the judicial processes" 3 73 must itself have "a di-
rect stake in the outcome." 374 Mountain States, however, could show noth-
ing more than "an indirect stake in the action. ' 375 This did not fulfill the
standing requirement of "an injury in fact bringing the party within the
zone of interests protected by the Clean Air Act."
'3 76
The Tenth Circuit held that Mountain States also lacked standing to
sue on behalf of its officers, members, and supporters. Nothing in the record
indicated that they had "that necessary 'personal stake' demonstrating in-
jury in fact, ' '3 77 since the only resources at stake were membership fees or tax
payments, which in themselves are not enough to confer standing. Nor was
there any showing that their activities within the organization were or would
be affected by the challenged EPA actions. It is necessary, under the APA,
for members of organizations to demonstrate that the statute or regulation
they challenge possesses "some articulable 'cause-and-effect' relation to an
identifiable 'injury' which, in fact, affects them."
'378
Mountain States had requested a court order setting aside the EPA ac-
tions as unconstitutional and punitive toward the State of Colorado. Moun-
tain States had invited Governor Lamm to order the attorney general to
"represent the state's interest in this grave constitutional matter, '3 79 and an-
nounced its intent to represent the state ex relatione, since the attorney general
had manifested no desire to do so. 380 The court described Mountain States'
statements as an acknowledgement that their challenges directly affected the
interests of the State of Colorado; such challenges may be advanced only by
the attorney general who, in this case, refused to equate the state's interests
with those alleged by Mountain States.
38'
The petitioners included twenty-seven named members of the Colorado
369. Id.
370. 630 F.2d at 767 (citing United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (F973) and Sierra Club
v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972)).
371. 630 F.2d at 767.
372. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
373. 630 F.2d at 767 (quoting 405 U.S. at 740).
374. 630 F.2d at 767 (quoting 405 U.S. at 740).
375. 630 F.2d at 767.
376. Id.
377. Id.
378. Id. at 768.
379. Id.
380. Id.
381. Id. The court then cited two cases standing for the proposition that neither citizens,
nor taxpayers, nor other "private attorney generals" have standing to bring derivative actions
on behalf of state or public interests, unless a private injury is alleged. Gallagher v. Continental
Ins. Co., 502 F.2d 827 (10th Cir. 1974); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 481
F.2d 116 (10th Cir. 1973).
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General Assembly. Mountain States claimed the legislators had standing on
the ground that the EPA actions, compelling passage of certain legislation,
infringed upon the legislators' freedom of speech and first amendment right
to vote according to their constituents' wishes.
38 2
The court ruled that the legislators lacked standing to raise these claims,
and cited Lamm v. Volpe 383 as precedent. In Lamm, the court had denied
standing to the plaintiff who sought-as a citizen, taxpayer, and legislator-
a declaratory judgment that a Highway Beautification Act provision 384 was
unconstitutional because it violated the tenth amendment by intimidating
the Colorado legislature into passing certain bills without due considera-
tion. 385 A private citizen, whether a legislator, a citizen, or a taxpayer, must
demonstrate a personal stake in a lawsuit, and show "that he is the proper
party to request adjudication of the particular issue," 386 in order to have
standing.
The Mountain States court concluded by affirming that the State of Colo-
rado was the real party in interest, and the only one with standing to chal-
lenge the EPA action. 387 It also observed that the Colorado Supreme Court
had held that Colorado law38 8 grants the attorney general the exclusive
right, absent a contrary statute, to represent the state in lawsuits to protect
state interests.389 The attorney general, then, is "the exclusive legal repre-
sentative of the state in all [public interest] litigation. '" 3 9 0 Mountain States
lacked standing to represent the state in an ex relatz'one capacity.
The court declined to rule on Mountain States' constitutional and stat-
utory challenges, since the petitioners were deemed to be without standing,
and the state did not advance such challenges.
39 1
Finally, the court ruled that all the contentions raised by the State of
Colorado, as intervenor, were moot, because while the lawsuit was pending,
the EPA finally approved Colorado's I/M program for inclusion in its SIP,
and removed the restrictions on federal funding and stationary source con-
truction. 392 Thus, the petition for review was dismissed.
XIII. AGENCY INVESTIGATIVE AUTHORITY
In CAB v. Frontier Airlines, InC., 393 the issue was whether the CAB had
the authority toinspect all minutes of Frontier Airlines directors' meetings
382. 630 F.2d at 769-70.
383. 449 F.2d 1202 (10th Cir. 1971).
384. 23 U.S.C. § 131 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
385. 449 F.2d at 1203-05.
386. 630 F.2d at 770.
387. Id. at 771.
388. CoLO. REv. STAT. § 24-31-101(1)(a) (1973 & Supp. 1980).
389. 630 F.2d at 771 (citing State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Hallett, 88 Colo. 331, 296 P. 540
(1937)).
390. 630 F.2d at 771.
391. Id. at 772.
392. Id.




without showing that the minutes sought were relevant to a proper investiga-
tory purpose.
Frontier Airlines, a regulated air carrier, is subject to CAB control over
its fares and accounting standards, in relation to the government subsidies
the airline receives. The CAB is authorized under the Federal Aviation Act
of 1958394 to "prescribe the forms of any and all accounts, records, and
memoranda to be kept by air carriers . ..and the length of time such ac-
counts, records, and memoranda shall be preserved. '395 The CAB is also
permitted access, at all times, "to all accounts, records, and memorandums
• . . required to be kept by air carriers. . . and it may employ special agents
or auditors, who shall have authority .. .to inspect and examine any and
all such . . .accounts, records, and memorandums.
' 396
During a routine examination of Frontier Airlines' records, CAB audi-
tors requested access to all the minutes of directors' meetings and other com-
mittee meetings within the corporation. Frontier Airlines refused to allow
CAB to inspect the records until CAB showed "that its request was reason-
ably definite and relevant to a proper investigative purpose." 39 7 The CAB
responded only that its auditors were noting "the occurrence of all major
transactions approved since the period of the last audit. ' 398 Frontier Air-
lines agreed to submit to CAB the minutes relating to records of accounts or
other information reported to the agency, as well as board-and-committee-
approved resolutions.
399
The CAB petitioned the Federal District Court for the District of Colo-
rado, requesting that the court order Frontier Airlines to allow the CAB to
inspect the corporate minutes requested. The district court agreed with
Frontier Airlines' assertion that the CAB's inspection authority should be
limited to the parts of the record directly relevant to the area under investi-
gation. 4° ° The district court stated that to rule otherwise would give the
CAB "unlimited power of inspection equivalent to a general warrant, pow-
ers which .. .the CAB does not have." 4 1
The court of appeals reversed in an opinion written by Judge Logan,
and remanded the case on the ground that no precedent existed to support
limitations on the statutory authority of CAB and other agencies "to inspect
the business records they properly require to be kept. ' '4°2 The court held
that administrative agencies may inspect records reasonably required to be
kept, not only in order to obtain information needed for regulatory purposes,
but also to determine "whether or not such records are being kept, and
394. Section 407(d), 49 U.S.C. § 1377(d) (1976).
395. Id. The Tenth Circuit Court noted that the CAB had exercised its authority under
§ 407(d) to issue "regulations requiring carriers to preserve permanently the minutes of meet-
ings of directors and of the executive and other directors committees." No. 79-1584, slip op. at
2. See 14 C.F.R. § 249.13 (1981).
396. Section 407(e), 49 U.S.C. § 1377(e) (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
397. No. 79-1584, slip op. at 3.
398. Id.
399. Id.
400. Id., slip op. at 3-4.
401. Id., slip op. at 4.
402. Id., slip op. at 7.
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whether or not they are being kept in such a way as to make available the
specified information. '40 3  The question before the Tenth Circuit was
whether the CAB could examine the minutes in their entirety, including ir-
relevant items, or whether it must specify beforehand the portions sought
and the reasons therefor, with investigatory power limited to "portions...
relevant to a proper purpose."
4 °4
The Tenth Circuit Court first expressed its belief that the CAB could
not require air carriers under its jurisdiction to keep certain records, and
subsequently enjoy unlimited access to those records. The intent behind the
relevant Federal Aviation Act provisions was to permit CAB prescription of,
and access to, records "likely to produce material relevant to [CAB's] proper
regulatory and investigative authority."'4 0 5 Directors' minutes, which are
among "the most basic corporate records," 4° 6 do contain material properly
required by an agency that determines amounts a corporation can charge for
its principal activity.4 0 7 Hence, the court concluded that the CAB rule 4° 8
requiring regulated airlines to maintain and preserve corporate minutes was
within the scope of CAB's authority under the Federal Aviation Act. 4° 9
Having thus concluded, the court next asked whether there was an im-
plicit limitation on the CAB's power to examine these records. No such limi-
tation was expressed in the Federal Aviation Act.
4 10
The court observed that Congress had modeled the authority given to
the CAB under the Federal Aviation Act 4 11 on a provision in the Interstate
Commerce Act, 4 12 which had given the ICC similar authority over the rail-
roads.4 13 Cases delineating the boundaries of the ICC's investigatory powers
thus apply as well to an analysis of the CAB's authority. The court noted
that the United States Supreme Court had considered the ICC's right to
inspect railroad records in United States v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad.
4 14
The Supreme Court had indicated that the ICC was not limited in its power
to examine "records it properly required to be kept, including corporate
minutes. ' 4 15 Thus, an administrative agency may inspect records it reason-
ably requires to be kept, not only for regulatory reasons, but also to make
certain the records are being properly kept.
4 16
403. Id., slip op. at 6-7 (quoting Fleming v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 114 F.2d 384, 391
(7th Cir.), cati. den'ed, 311 U.S. 690 (1940)).
404. No. 79-1584, slip op. at 3. The parties stipulated that some material in the minutes
sought was relevant to the CAB's regulatory purpose, but that it was probable there were also
irrelevant items. Id.
405. Id., slip op. at 4.
406. Id.
407. Id.
408. 14 C.F.R. § 249.13(o (1981).
409. 49 U.S.C. § 1377(d) (1976); No. 79-1584, slip op. at 5.
410. 49 U.S.C. § 1377(e) (1976 & Supp. III 1979); No. 79-1584, slip op. at 5.
411. 49 U.S.C. § 1377(e) (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
412. 49 U.S.C. § 20(6) (repealed 1978).
413. No. 79-1584, slip op. at 5.
414. 236 U.S. 318 (1914).
415. No. 79-1584, slip op. at 5.
416. Id., slip op. at 6-7 (citing Fleming v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 114 F.2d 384, 391 (7th
Cir.), ftn. drnied, 311 U.S. 690 (1940)).
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Judge Breitenstein dissented from the majority holding. He believed
that the information sought by the agency must be "reasonably relevant to a
proper investigative purpose within [the agency's] jurisdiction '4 17 in order
for the agency to have authority to inspect corporate minutes. Judge Brei-
tenstein argued that CAB now enjoyed an "administrative fiat" of a type
"odious in both English and American history. '4 18
The majority had distinguished CAB v. United Airlines, Inc.4 19 on the
basis that in United Airlines no regulation required the keeping of the records
sought by the CAB, whereas in the Frontier Airlines case, the records sought
were mandated by law. Judge Breitenstein disagreed with this distinction.
The question, he maintained, was not whether the records were required,
but "whether the information sought is relevant to a proper investigative
purpose. '420 Judge Breitenstein maintained that the CAB sought "unquali-
fied access, an impermissible general warrant."
42 1
XIV. THE AUTHORITY OF THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR TO
CHANGE TRIBAL ROLLS
In Sac &Fox Tribe of Indians of Oklahoma v. Andrus,422 the Tenth Circuit
held that the Secretary of the Interior had no authority to change the tribal
status of certain individuals upon appeal from a tribal committee decision,
four years after a tribal roll became final.
42 3
In 1967 or 1968, the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) began urging the
Sac and Fox tribe to prepare a roll of tribal members by reviewing and cor-
recting the 1937 roll. The roll was to be used in the distribution of Indian
claim settlement funds to the Sac and Fox tribe. 424 The tribe revised the
roll, removing the names of those who lacked the requisite one-quarter Sac
and Fox blood. This requirement was set by the tribe's constitution.
42 5
Among the names removed was that of Susan Nawashe, who, according
to the tribe's business committee, was not a tribe member but was, instead, a
Shawnee married to a Sac and Fox tribe member.426 The tribe's business
committee then reduced the quantum of Sac and Fox blood attributed to
the offspring of those removed from the roll, resulting in the further removal
of the names of several descendants, including the intervenors, Susan
417. No. 19-1584, dissenting op. at I (citing United States v. Morton Salt Co., 388 U.S. 632,
652 (1949)).
418. No. 79-1584, dissenting op. at 2 (quoting Oklahoma Press Publ. Co. v. Walling, 327
U.S. 186, 207 (1945)).
419. 542 F.2d 394 (7th Cir. 1976). In this case, the court held that the CAB did not have
the right of unconditioned access to airline records without specifying an investigative purpose
and making a reasonably definite demand.
420. No. 79-1584, dissenting op. at 2.
421. M. (citing CAB v. United Airlines, Inc., 542 F.2d 394 (7th Cir. 1976)).
422. 645 F.2d 858 (10th Cir. 1981).
423. The roll determines who can participate in the distribution of federally-derived funds.
It does not make those on the roll tribe members for any other purpose. Id. at 860.





Nawashe's great-grandchildren, who no longer were deemed to meet the
one-quarter blood requirement.4 27 The committee then sent notices to those
who were disenrolled or who had their status changed, and advised them of
the changes and their right to appeal within a designated time.
42 8
The BIA, through a letter from its acting deputy commissioner, ap-
proved the updated roll in May 1968, in accordance with federal law.
4 2 9
The revised 1937 roll then became final, as did the disenrollment of several
former tribe members, including Susan Nawashe and her great-
grandchildren.
In 1971, however, the issue was revived. The tribe's business committee
passed a resolution affirming the 1968 disenrollment. In September 1972,
the BIA deputy commissioner sent the tribe a letter reaffirming the prior
approval of the roll, but permitting appeals by the heirs. Susan Nawashe's
heirs appealed and, in June 1974, an associate solicitor of the Interior de-
cided that Susan Nawashe was a Sac and Fox tribe member, since she had
been adopted into the tribe, and BIA policy dictated that those who were
recognized as tribe members because of marriage, adoption, or other formal-
ity, before the firm establishment of membership rights, were to be regarded
as "possessing the blood of the tribe with which they affiliated.
'430
The tribe's request for reconsideration was granted. The acting Secre-
tary of the Interior affirmed the Associate Solicitor's decision. The tribe then
sought review in the Federal District Court for the Western District of
Oklahoma, 43 i which affirmed the Secretary's decision.
The Tenth Circuit reversed on the basis that the Secretary's approval of
the revised 1937 role was "final and conclusive."'432 Those whose tribal sta-
tus was changed had been notified in 1968, and had not appealed. Hence,
the approved roll "became the final roll and was conclusive as the the quan-
tum of Sac and Fox blood of the intervenors. ' '433 The Secretary thus pos-
sessed no authority to change the tribal status of individuals upon appeal
four years after the roll became final. 434 The court set the Secretary's deci-
sion aside and declared the revised and approved 1937 tribal roll to be con-





429. 25 U.S.C. § 163 (1976). The applicable provision authorizes the Secretary of the Inte-
rior "to cause a final roll to be made of the membership of any Indian tribe." The rolls must
contain "the ages and quantum of Indian blood," and, when approved by the Secretary, are
deemed "to constitute the legal membership of the respective tribes for the purpose of segregat-
ing the tribal funds as provided in section 162 of this title, and shall be conclusive both as to the
ages and quantum of Indian blood . I..." d.
430. 645 F.2d at 860 (citing a letter from Duard Barnes, Associate Solicitor of the Interior,
to the Sac and Fox tribe, 1974).
431. 645 F.2d at 860.
432. Id. at 861. The court based its decision on the language in 25 U.S.C. § 163 (1976).
The court also commented on the inadequacy of the administrative record in this case. Most
disturbing to the court was the omission from the record of the letter from the BIA approving
the tribal roll. 645 F.2d at 860-61.





XV. AGRICULTURAL ADJUSTMENT ACT PAYMENTS
In Martin v. Bergland,4 36 the Tenth Circuit upheld the district court's
refusal to declare unconstitutional a Department of Agriculture regulation
stating that a husband and wife shall be considered as one person for pur-
poses of payments to farmers under the Agricultural Adjustment Act of
1938.
4 37
The regulation was promulgated as part of a congressional attempt "to
avoid surpluses and shortages in farm products. ' 438 Farmers taking part in
programs designed to achieve this objective receive payments based on a
formula in the Act. 4 39 Because there was public protest against "large pay-
ments received by individual farmers who kept their farms idle," 440 the pay-
ments were limited to $20,000 per "person."'44 1  The Secretary of
Agriculture, following a congressional mandate, defined the term "per-
son" 442 as including a husband and wife as one person.
44 3
Before they were married, the appellants operated separate farms lo-
cated in different counties. After marriage, they maintained their respective
farms independently. Their accumulative entitlements would have exceeded
the $20,000 limit but for the husband-wife rule.444 The appellants main-
tained the rule was unconstitutional on equal protection and due process
grounds, and because it caused a forfeiture of their contractual rights.44 5
The appellants' main argument was that the husband-wife rule denied them
equal protection of the laws under the fifth amendment, since the rule im-
permissibly interfered with the exercise of their fundamental right to
marry.446 Further, the appellants insisted that since one section of the regu-
lation" 7 adequately protected the intent to limit payments, the Secretary's
refusal to regard the two farms as separate, solely because the appellants
were married, was a denial of equal protection.
448
The court decided that the husband-wife rule was not a sufficient bur-
den on the appellants' freedom to marry to warrant strict scrutiny. The
court cited two United States Supreme Court decisions, Zablocki v. Redhai/
4 49
and Caifano v.Jobst,4 50 for the proposition that although the right to marry is
436. 639 F.2d 647 (10th Cir. 1981).
437. 7 U.S.C. § 1281 (1976).
438. 639 F.2d at 648.
439. 7 U.S.C. § 1445a (1976).
440. 639 F.2d at 648.
441. Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-86, 87 Stat. 221.
442. 7 C.F.R. § 795.3 (1981), which designated the generally applicable "conditions in ac-
cordance with which an entity will be deemed a 'person' for purposes of the payment limita-
tion." 639 F.2d at 648.
443. 7 C.F.R. § 795.11 (1981).
444. 639 F.2d at 649.
445. Id. at 648.
446. Id. at 649-50. The appellants admitted that married persons do not constitute a sus-
pect class for purposes of equal protection analysis. Id. But because a fundamental fight alleg-
edly was involved, they urged that a strict scrutiny test be applied. Id.
447. 7 C.F.R. § 795.3 (1981).
448. 639 F.2d at 649-50.
449. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
450. 434 U.S. 47 (1977).
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a fundamental one, not every regulation that interferes with it must be
strictly scrutinized. 45' The inapplicability of the strict scrutiny test in this
case placed the burden on the appellants of proving the lack of a rational
basis for the husband-wife rule. Because the appellants did not demonstrate
such a lack of rational basis, the court concluded that the rule rationally
furthered the congressional interest "in limiting farm subsidy payments to
$20,000 per 'person.' "452 Limiting each married couple to one payment
serves to reduce public hostility against large payments to farmers and farm
households for keeping land idle.453 Also, the "economic interdependency"
of married couples-even those who maintain separate farms-provides a
rational basis for the Secretary's determination that "married couples are a
single economic unit entitled to a single farm support payment. 
'454
The appellants objected to the husband-wife rule also on the ground
that it created an "irrebuttable presumption" that they constituted a single
producer, even though they operated their respective farms independently.
Such a presumption, the appellants argued, violated their due process
rights.4 55 The court rejected this claim on the ground that the irrebuttable
presumption doctrine was inapplicable to the case at hand and, in any event,
was probably "moribund. '4 56 However, even if the doctrine were viable
and applicable, the appellants could not have prevailed on it, because they
misstated the presumption of the husband-wife rule. The rule did not
merely presume that a married couple's farming interests were co-managed;
it also sought to ensure that each economically interdependent unit received
no more than $20,000. 4 5 7 The appellants' "irrebuttable presumption" argu-
ment failed because they did not challenge the presumption that their farms
were economically interdependent.
45a
Finally, the court dismissed the appellants' final challenge, that the hus-
band-wife rule operated as an unconscionable and inequitable forfeiture of
their contractual rights, since it was not brought to their attention when they
signed their agreement with the government. The rule, it was claimed,
thereby "operated as an adhesion clause rendering the agreement uncon-
scionable." '4 59 This argument was rejected on the ground that "Congress has
provided that the appearance of rules and regulations in the Federal Regis-
ter gives legal notice of their contents. ' '4 6 0 Also, case law mandates that
451. 639 F.2d at 649-50.
452. Id. at 650.
453. Id.
454. Id. at 651.
455. Id. The Supreme Court cases cited by the appellants in support of the use of the ir-
rebuttable presumption doctrine included Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632




459. Id. at 652.
460. Id. (citing Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 385 (1947)).
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461. Id. (citing Jackson v. United States, 573 F.2d 1189, 1194 (Ct. CI. 1978)).
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